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 This thesis presents a series of studies on electricity market design and environmental 
policy. The studies cover the interaction between electricity market structure and renewable 
energy, demand side measures to improve electricity market efficiency, and effects of carbon 
policy on electricity production. Chapter 1 shows how a competitive electricity market in the 
Midwestern US. affected wind energy when it began in the mid-2000’s. Chapter 2 identifies 
consumer savings and other effects of improving demand side participation in electricity 
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EFFECTS OF WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS ON WIND GENERATION IN THE 
MIDWESTERN UNITED STATES 
Modified from a paper published in Energy Policy1 
Steve Dahlke 
1.1.Abstract 
This paper estimates the effect of starting the Midcontinent ISO electricity market in 2005 
on wind generation. An average increase in wind plant capacity factors of 1.7 – 2.8 percentage 
points associated with the start of the market is estimated, relative to neighboring wind plants not 
in the market. These results are robust to potentially confounding variation associated with wind 
speed differences determined by weather. Policy makers in regions of increasing wind generation 
should consider expanding the wholesale market region as a tool to deal with variability of 
renewable generation. Many technical experts and market participants provide anecdotes that 
competitive wholesale markets are beneficial for wind energy, this analysis provides the first 
statistical evidence to support that claim.  
1.2. Introduction 
Market restructuring in the U.S. electricity sector began in the mid-1990’s as an effort by 
utility regulators and state legislatures to improve efficiency through increased competition. The 
first states to restructure were those in the northeastern U.S., as well as Texas and California. 
Some states introduced competition in  wholesale generation and retail distribution of electricity. 
Others introduced competition only among generation and left their retail sectors as regulated 
distribution monopolies. Other states considered deregulation until market manipulation by 
participants in California increased prices and caused large-scale blackouts in 2000 and 2001 [1]. 
Momentum to deregulate the electricity sector in the U.S. stopped after California’s experience. 
The result today is some electricity markets have competitive wholesale generation and/or retail 
sectors, while others remain as regulated monopolies. Policy goals for the electricity sector 
during this initial wave of restructuring were primarily to ensure reliability and efficient, low-
cost service. Recently, reducing environmental emissions has grown in importance among 
                                                 




policymakers. The effects of differing market structures on renewable generation to date have 
largely been unexplored.  
One successful aspect of electricity market restructuring was the establishment of 
independent system operators (ISO’s) to manage wholesale electricity markets. ISO’s are 
independent non-profit entities who oversee the high-voltage transmission network, manage the 
wholesale markets, and schedule generation. Even though momentum to restructure declined 
after 2000, the benefits realized by ISO-managed markets were such that ISO’s have continued 
to spread to regulated regions. In these regions, ISO’s have begun centralized dispatch of 
generation owned by monopoly utilities to minimize costs across the entire region [2]. These 
regions have a hybrid market structure consisting of regulated monopoly utilities operating in a 
competitive wholesale market. One example of hybrid market restructuring was the launch of the 
Midcontinent ISO market in 2005.  
Prior to this paper, there has been no published statistical assessment of the effect of 
electricity market restructuring on wind energy production. This is in part because there was 
little wind generation when major market restructuring took place in the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s, a time which motivated significant economic analysis (see Figure 1.1 for installed wind 
capacity in the U.S. over time). I expect a wholesale market like MISO to increase wind 
generation, all else equal, by increasing the size of the market region, improving efficiency of 
dispatch procedures, and increasing the granularity of dispatch intervals. These market 
characteristics will be discussed in more detail throughout the paper. In this analysis, I assemble 
a dataset and build a model that isolates the effect of starting the Midcontinent ISO market on 
wind electricity production. The MISO market is in a region rich with wind resources, and began 
operating at a time when there was enough wind production data available to conduct the 
analysis. I conclude that the MISO market resulted in an increase in monthly average capacity 
factors by 1.7 – 2.8 percentage points, relative to comparable wind plants not in the ISO market. 
This increase is equivalent to about $500,000 in annual revenue for a 50-megawatt plant at 




Figure 1.1 Installed wind capacity in the U.S. [3]. 
1.3. Literature review 
Previous studies in the literature have identified efficiency gains for power plants in 
restructured markets due to increased short run competition from the day ahead and real time 
markets. Fabrizio et al. identify reductions in labor and nonfuel expenses of 3-5% for investor-
owned power plants [4]. Additionally, Chan et al. find similar levels of input cost reductions for 
investor-owned coal plants and calculate that restructuring has led to roughly 6.5 million dollars 
in annual cost savings and up to a 7.6 percent emissions reduction per plant [5]. These studies 
looked at coal and gas power plants, and focused on the major wave of restructuring which 
occurred shortly before 2000. The question of how centrally dispatched wholesale markets 
impact renewable energy is important today, as states contemplate further market reforms to help 
manage higher penetrations of renewable electricity.  
Benefits from an ISO market also include reducing the transaction costs associated with 
short run electricity trade across market participants’ service territories, which previously had to 
be negotiated on a bilateral basis. A long history of economic literature has placed transaction 
costs as a central driver determining the organization of firms within an industry and their 
interactions in a market [6]–[8]. If establishing an ISO market decreases the costs to transact 
electricity across firms in a way that exceeds the administrative costs of establishing the market, 
then we expect firms to organize in this way. Due to the physical transmission network 
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characteristics and lack of storage unique to electricity, this involves a collective outsourcing of 
the daily production and transmission scheduling from the individual producers to the ISO.  
The ISO is a non-profit entity and acts as a market-wide social planner making the short 
run operational decisions after collecting daily bids and offers from participants. Establishing an 
ISO doesn’t necessitate any changes to asset ownership. These markets were established as part 
of broader electricity restructuring reforms that involved divesting assets in the late 1990’s and 
early 2000’s in the northeastern U.S., California, and Texas. More recently, however, ISO 
markets have been established without significant changes asset ownership, including the MISO. 
The broader impacts of divesting or disaggregating parts of the industry are beyond the scope of 
this analysis. Establishing an ISO centralizes and geographically expands the task of daily 
electricity operations. This geographic expansion has important implications for the operation of 
wind plants, which is discussed further in section 1.3. The new market enables participants to 
trade across the region at lower cost and with reduced transmission congestion, compared to the 
pre-ISO situation where each producer operated their individual systems and traded bilaterally 
across systems by negotiating individual contracts with each neighbor.  
The full costs of setting up an ISO market are incurred both by the ISO itself and market 
participants. They mostly include building the institutional and computing infrastructure 
acquiring the ISO, and acquiring and reorganizing the human capital necessary to operate the 
regional market. These costs can be difficult to establish with precision unless there is 
transparent reporting by the firms involved. Mansur and White (2012) study a large eastward 
expansion in PJM, the northeastern ISO market, and estimate one-time implementation costs of 
$40 million, based on regulatory accounting filings. They also estimate operational efficiency 
gains valued at $163 million in the first year from this market expansion. The fact that these 
initial benefits dwarf the implementation costs likely explain the large expansion of ISO markets 
across the U.S. The first market being established in the late-1990’s, and today the majority of 
electricity production is within an ISO market. 
I expect an ISO market to have a positive impact on wind generation. Kirby and Milligan 
present qualitative evidence in support of this hypothesis from market participants, regulators, 
and other technical experts [9]. They identify two main reasons for this; 1) "they provide 
electrically and geographically large open markets for wind integration,” and 2) “they operate 
sub-hourly balancing markets,” which are ideal for addressing the short-term variability in wind 
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plant output. Both market characteristics decrease the likelihood of having to shut down a wind 
plant due to external constraints, also referred to as curtailment. First, having wind resources 
spread across a larger market geography will decrease the variance of total wind generation, 
lessening the need for curtailment. Second, sub-hourly dispatch intervals are beneficial for wind 
energy because they reduce the probability for generation curtailment caused by forecasting 
errors; for example, it is easier to predict wind production over the 5-minutes intervals typical of 
ISOs than over hourly intervals.  
Furthermore, experience has shown that issues associated with wind plant variability and 
its effect on ramping of fossil fuel plants are negligible in a competitive market. Kaffine and 
McBee look at the effect of wind intermittency on system emissions from fossil fuel ramping in 
the Southwest Power Pool market [10]. They find a minor increase in emissions, on the order of 
a few percent relative to the overall emissions savings from wind energy. Finally, having a 
centrally operated regional market involves more efficient curtailment procedures than what is 
federally required for non-market regions, lessening the need to curtail generators due to 
transmission congestion. All these mechanisms are discussed in more detail in the next section. 
1.4. Background 
On April 1, 2005 MISO launched their wholesale energy market and began centrally 
dispatching power generation throughout the central United States. Aggregating over a larger 
region has the effect of decreasing the variance of total wind generation, reducing the need to 
curtail. Curtailment data during this time is not available, but we can indirectly measure the 
effect on curtailments by looking at the change in generator capacity factors. When a wind plant 
is curtailed less, its capacity factor will increase. In 2005, the large majority of wind in the MISO 
region was in either Minnesota or Iowa. These areas became export constrained as wind 
generation quickly exceed local electricity demand beginning in the early 2000’s.2 Traditionally, 
utilities in Iowa and Minnesota managed wind generation and other generators to meet demand 
on their own systems. Once the market began, MISO operators started balancing flows and 
improving regional dispatch of power on an aggregated system that included Iowa, Minnesota, 
and other states in the region. 
                                                 
2For example, in the mid-2000’s in the Buffalo Ridge region of Southwest Minnesota, there were approximately 500 
MW of wind generation, while local peak electricity demand was 44 MW [11]. 
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Combining wind plants on a larger system is beneficial to operators and wind plants 
because it reduces the variance of total wind output. This is because output from wind plants that 
are farther from each other experience different wind patterns and thus have a lower correlation 
of output. Aggregating output from uncorrelated variable wind generation as the MISO market 
did results in a lower system variance relative to a smaller system with plants that have 
correlated output. This phenomenon was documented by Ernst [12].  
I illustrate this mechanism with the following model. Consider a system with 𝐼 
interconnected wind plants indexed by 𝑖, with total plant capacity denoted by 𝐶𝑖 and average 
plant capacity factor 𝐶𝐹𝑖. Because plant output is largely determined by random variation in 
wind speeds, we can model potential plant output in each period 𝑡 as a truncated normally 
distributed random variable 𝑌𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁(𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑖, 𝜎𝑌2) where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝐶𝑖). The correlation between 
any two wind plants 𝐶𝑜𝑟(𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑌𝑗𝑡) is a function of the distance between plants. The correlation is 
higher when plants are closer together. The variance of the sum of all wind plant output 𝑉𝑎𝑟(∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖 ) is larger when the correlation between plants’ outputs are higher. This increases the 
likelihood of curtailment. System demand can also be modeled as a random variable normally 
distributed truncated to be above zero, 𝐷𝑡 ~ 𝑁(𝜇𝐷 , 𝜎𝐷2) where 𝐷𝑡 > 0.3 When ∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖 > 𝐷𝑡, wind 
output in excess of demand is curtailed and actual wind output is ∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖 − 𝐷𝑡. When ∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖 < 𝐷𝑡, 
it is assumed a flexible generator is dispatched to meet the shortfall. 
To illustrate with an example, assume two identical wind plants each with a capacity 𝐶𝑖 
of 100MW and 𝐶𝐹𝑖 = 0.4, so each plant generates an expected amount of 40 MW each period. 
Plant output is random because it is determined by weather, so each plant has an expected output 
of 40 every period, with a standard deviation assumed to be 15. Since a system operator is 
primarily concerned with balancing total supply, we can calculate the variance of combined wind 
generation. If both plants are in the same location (southwest Minnesota, for example) they will 
experience the same wind speeds, and their output will be correlated. In the case where output is 
perfectly correlated, the variance of total wind generation on this system will be equal to 900.4 If 
                                                 
3 One could add seasonal effects to wind generation and demand without changing the conclusions of this exercise. 
We omit these for simplicity. 
4The sum of the variance of two random variables equals the sum of the individual variances plus two times their 




we assume the two plants are on a larger system in different locations with different wind 
patterns (one in Minnesota, the other in Iowa, for example) then the correlation between 𝑌1 and 𝑌2 will be lower. In the case with zero correlation the total variance on the system will reduce to 
550, lessening the need to curtail.  
Now assume electricity demand on this system is 100 MW on average, but can vary 
randomly with a standard deviation of 10, or 𝐷𝑡~𝑁(100, 10). Thus, the expected value of 
demand each period is 100, and the expected value of total wind output is 𝐸[𝑌1𝑡] + 𝐸[𝑌2𝑡] = 80. 
We will assume flexible generators are available to meet any shortfall in electricity net of wind 
power. Curtailment of wind will occur when total wind generation exceeds demand. Figure 1.2 
presents a simulation of this system over 100 time periods. The thin black line represents 
combined wind output, and the thick black line is electricity demand. Whenever wind output 
exceeds demand, the output is curtailed. The chart on the left simulates the wind plants in the 
same location where output from the two are perfectly correlated. The right chart assumes plants 
in distant locations, where the wind output is uncorrelated. The variance of combined wind 
output on the right side is lower, resulting in less curtailments. In these two simulations, total 
curtailments on the left chart are 525 MW per period, or about 6.5% of the total potential wind. 
Total curtailments on the right chart are 225, or about 3% of total potential wind. 
Table 1 lists curtailment numbers as the simulation results converge after many periods. 
As the correlation in output between the plants declines, average curtailments also decline. To 
illustrate further, consider Figure 1.3, a map of wind capacity by counties in southern Minnesota 
and northern Iowa at the beginning of 2004. These two states contained the majority of wind 
generation in the MISO region during this time. The map shows installed wind capacity across 
multiple utility territories that joined the MISO market in 2005. We use data from the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, explained in more detail in the next section. Consider 
Lincoln and Pipestone counties in southwestern Minnesota, labeled 1 and 2 respectively.  
Because the counties are so close together, wind generation is highly correlated. In the period 
2004-2006, total monthly generation in Lincoln and Pipestone counties had a correlation 
coefficient of 0.95. The correlation declines when you compare with generation farther away. 
For example the correlation between wind generation in Lincoln and Buena Vista counties (1 and 
3) over the same period was 0.89, and correlation between Lincoln and Hancock counties (1 and 




Figure 1.2 Simulated wind plants when output is correlated and uncorrelated. The thin line 
represents total wind output, the thick line is electricity demand. 
 
Table 1.1 Average curtailment as correlation in output decreases. 
 
In addition to a larger system, the second reason why an ISO system reduces wind 
curtailments are because of the transition from hourly to five-minute dispatch intervals. In the 
previous simulation example, we assumed any shortfall in electricity production was met by a 
flexible generator. An hourly dispatch schedule limits the flexibility by which this generation can 
respond to changes in wind output, which can vary considerably within an hour. If an operator 
was unable to lower a generator’s output in time to balance a sudden surge in wind output, they 
would need to curtail the wind. A five-minute dispatch schedule allows an operator to adjust 
their conventional generation every few minutes to better balance changes in wind output. 
Furthermore, Milligan et al. show that forecast error improves as the markets operate closer to 
real time [13]. 
 










Figure 1.3 Installed wind capacity by county. 1: Lincoln, 2: Pipestone, 3: Buena Vista, 4: 
Hancock 
 
Related to this, the MISO market further improved the way curtailments were handled to 
better manage transmission congestion on the regional system. Prior to the organized market, 
individual grid operators managed congestion by submitting a Transmission Loading Relief 
(TLR) request to NERC. TLRs are a blunt approach to mitigating congestion that generally 
results in unnecessary curtailments beyond the localized issue.5 Using locational marginal price 
(LMP) signals through an organized are a more efficient way to mitigate congestion, incenting 
market participants to internalize the costs of congestion in their energy bids. Furthermore, 
LMPs better incent new investment where it is needed most. Consistent with this viewpoint, the 
MISO Independent Market Monitor (IMM) reported at the time of the market launch that “the 
TLR Process is a relatively inefficient means to manage transmission congestion, requiring more 
than three times the quantity of redispatch/curtailment as an LMP market to manage the same 
congestion” [15].   
The IMM also reported the most significant areas of congestion in MISO were on the 
transmission lines linking the windy areas of Minnesota and MAPP (Mid-Continent Area Power 
                                                 
5 Rajaraman & Alvarado provide more information on NERC’s TLR procedure and related inefficiencies [14]. 
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Pool) regions with the eastern portions of the system, where the majority of electricity demand 
exists. They report that MISO region TLR procedures prior to the market were significant, 
consisting of more than one-half of all TLRs in the Eastern Interconnect [15]. In fact, after the 
first year of MISO market operations, the IMM reported a decrease in curtailments of wholesale 
transactions by 75% over the prior year [16]. 
In summary, large, competitive wholesale electricity markets work to increase wind 
generation because of three primary mechanisms. First, they aggregate wind over a large system. 
Second, they improve dispatch efficiency by reducing forecasting error through shorter dispatch 
periods. Third, market operators use more efficient transmission congestion management 
procedures. The remainder of the paper sets up the process by which we will test for and quantify 
the increase in wind capacity factors after the start of the MISO market. The effect I test for will 
be the net effect of the three market mechanisms described. 
1.5. Data 
The data used for this analysis consists of wind plant production data from the Energy 
Information Administration, published via Ventyx, and historical weather data from the National 
Center for Environmental Information, (NCEI), a department of the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The production data includes detailed monthly 
information for every power generation facility in the United States larger than 1 megawatt, and 
is subject to a confidentiality agreement with Ventyx. During the sample period 13 wind plants 
were identified that reported zero generation for some months. The likely causes of this include 
errors in data entry and processing, or that the wind plants were offline certain months for 
maintenance. In either case, these data irregularities are unrelated to the MISO market and for 
this reason I omit them from the analysis. The majority of these zero generation months occurred 
early in the plants’ operating lives, prior to the MISO market, and most of the plants were 
located in the MISO region. As a result, including these observations would overstate the 
estimated effect of the MISO market. Re-running the analysis with these plants included 
increases the estimated treatment effect from 1.7 – 2.8 to 5.0 – 6.7 percentage point increase in 
average capacity factor. A table listing these plants is located in Appendix 1.9.1. The weather 
data was pulled from NCEI’s Quality Controlled Local Climatological Database (QCLCD). 
From this dataset, historical monthly average wind speed data was pulled from approximately 
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1000 weather stations spread across the United States and matched each wind farm to the nearest 
weather station.  
1.6. Empirical Strategy 
The MISO energy market began operations in April 2005. The data shows that capacity 
factors for wind plants in MISO increased by 4.1 percentage points on average in the year 
following the MISO market launch. Average capacity factors and electricity production from 
wind plants before and after the market start are reported in Table 1.2. It is likely that other 
factors caused at least part of this increase in wind generation. The following sections discuss 
components of the econometric model used to isolate the effect of the MISO market launch on 
wind generation.  
Table 1.2 Average production for wind plants in MISO region before and after MISO market 
began. 
 
1.6.1.   Treatment and control groups 
In my analysis, I designate wind plants in the MISO market region as the treatment 
group. Wind plants in a neighboring region with similar levels of wind resource make up a 
control group. Figure 1.4 shows the states whose wind plants are in the treatment and control 
groups. The black states correspond to the MISO market region when it began in 2005.  
As shown in Table 1.3, there are more wind plants in the MISO treatment group, and they 
are smaller on average than plants in the control group. This is likely because states in the upper 
Midwest attracted early investment in wind energy, and the early wind plants were smaller. In 
the MISO group, 60 of the 66 plants are in Minnesota or Iowa; both are states that implemented 
early policies favorable for renewable energy development. These plants likely use older 
technology on average compared to plants in the treatment group.  
 
  
Apr 2004 - 
Mar 2005 
Apr 2005 - 
Mar 2006 








Figure 1.4 Map of states in treatment and control groups. 
 
Table 1.3 Characteristics of wind plants in treatment and control groups prior to MISO market. 
 
 Overall, states that joined the MISO market are more likely to have implemented laws 
more favorable to renewable energy. Four of the eight states in the MISO group voted democrat 
in at least three of the past four presidential elections spanning 2004-2016. Only two of the ten 
control group states similarly voted democrat, the political party that in the mid-2000’s was 
friendlier to renewable energy. Furthermore, five out of the eight states in the treatment group 
currently have legally binding renewable portfolio standards (RPS) of varying levels,6 with only 
5 out of 10 states in the control group having RPS laws. These laws are designed to stimulate 
                                                 
6 Two of these states implemented their RPS after the MISO market began, Minnesota in 2007 and Michigan in 
2008. 
 Treatment group Control group 
Avg capacity factor (%) 27.1 27.2 
Avg nameplate capacity (MW) 21.1 70.4 




investment in new renewable energy capacity. However, the effect we are testing for is an 
operational change made to existing wind units from the market change. Furthermore, there is no 
variation in RPS laws within the treatment group during our sample period from 2004-2006, as 
the laws were passed years before or after our sample period of interest. Many of these laws have 
escalators for interim targets that increase over time, however there were also no changes in 
interim targets in any states during the sample period.  Therefore, plant fixed effects are expected 
to pick up any differences in states due to RPS law implementation.   
Texas operated a competitive wholesale market during the sample period, and was the 
only state in the control group to do so. The Texas wholesale market (also known as ERCOT) 
began operations in the late 1990’s, and continued throughout my sample period. Because this 
state did not undergo a significant wholesale market change during the two year sample period 
(2004-2006), I do not expect inclusion of Texas to confound the MISO treatment estimate. Texas 
was included in the main specification because it had a large number of wind plants relative to 
other control states. Sensitivity tests that exclude Texas from the control group do not materially 
change the treatment estimate, described further in section 1.6.2. 
Table 1.4 shows the increase in average capacity factors for treatment and control groups 
for the year before and after the MISO market began. Using a basic difference in differences 
estimator with these four averages implies a 1.7 percentage point increase in average capacity 
factor for wind plants in the MISO region due to the MISO market. However, differences 
between treatment and control groups exist that may bias this result. These include differences in 
wind speeds and plant technology, both over time and across regions.  More detail on these 
issues and methods to address them are provided in the following three sections. 
 
Table 1.4 Change in average capacity factors for plants in treatment and control regions. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
 
 Pre-treatment Post-treatment Difference 













1.6.2. Wind speeds 
Historic wind speeds explain a significant portion of the month-to-month variation in the 
plant output measured in our data. Regressing average capacity factors on local average wind 
speed from our sample yields a positive, significant relationship with a slope coefficient of 2.7 
and an r-squared of 0.2, suggesting a one mile per hour increase in average monthly wind speed 
increases wind plant capacity factor by 2.7%. Not accounting for average wind speeds in our 
model could yield biased treatment effects. For example, if the MISO region had a windier year 
after the market launch relative to the control group our result would be biased upward. It does 
turn out to be the case that the second year of our sample period (April 2005 – March 2006) was 
windier than the previous year in the MISO region, with average wind speeds in the second year 
of 9.96 miles per hour, compared to 9.72 in the prior year. This suggests that some of the 
observed 9% increase in average capacity factor for plants in the MISO region can be explained 
by the weather. 
Moreover, the control region was also windier in the year following the start of the MISO 
market. From April 2004 – March 2005, wind speeds in the control region averaged 10.39 mph, 
and in the following year averaged 11.15 mph. These values are summarized in Table 1.5. Since 
the increase in wind speed is of a greater magnitude in the control region, we expect the 1.7 
difference in differences calculation presented above to be net-negatively biased by historic wind 
speeds, all else equal. 
 
Table 1.5 Average wind speed (miles per hour) in years before and after start of MISO market. 
 
1.6.3. Technology differences between plants 
It is possible that technology differences between plants in the treatment and control 
groups contribute to observed differences in capacity factors. For example, newer vintage plants 
may have higher efficiencies and operate at higher capacity factors over all time periods. 
Because plant technology is generally fixed over time, we can account for this with plant fixed 
 Pre-treatment Post-treatment Change 
Treatment region 9.72 9.96 0.24 




effects that control for average differences in capacity factors between plants. This modeling 
strategy also accounts for differences in capacity factors caused by a plant’s location and the 
wind resource associated with that location. Some wind plants are in windier areas, but fixed 
effects will control for this since plant location remains fixed over time. 
1.6.4. Model overview 
The model components described above are designed to account for the main sources of 
bias and isolate the effect of starting the MISO market on wind plant capacity factors in the 
MISO region. Mathematically, the model is represented as: 
 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1.1) 
 
Where the 𝑖 and 𝑡 subscripts index wind plants and months, respectively. Our sample includes all 
wind plants in operation per the Energy Information Administration’s survey form 923 data, and 
the time-period spans from April 2004 to March 2006. Additionally: 
 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡  is the average capacity factor for plant 𝑖 in month 𝑡. 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a binary indicator variable that changes from 0 to 1 for plants in the MISO 
region after the market begins in April, 2005. 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the average wind speed in miles per hour in month 𝑡, as recorded in the closest 
weather station to plant 𝑖. 𝛼𝑖   𝛿𝑡  are the fixed effect parameters for plant 𝑖 and month 𝑡, respectively.  𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an error term with an expected value of zero that captures the leftover, random 
variation in capacity factor not explained by the other model components. 
1.6.5. Model assumptions 
The primary assumption required for a causal interpretation of the treatment effect is that, 
conditional on the control variables, the slope of the change in capacity factors remains the same 
between the treatment and control groups, absent the treatment. This parallel trends assumption 
is fundamentally untestable, since we cannot observe wind production in the MISO region in the 
counterfactual scenario of no MISO market. Instead, we control for potentially confounding 
differences in plant technology with fixed effects, and wind speed differences across locations. 
Figure 1.10 in the following section provides evidence of relatively similar pre-treatment trends 
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prior to the market. This suggests that conditional on the controls, it is likely the pre-MISO 
market trend would have continued in the absence of the MISO market. 
1.7. Results 
The model is solved by calculating the values of 𝛾, 𝛽, 𝛼𝑖,  and 𝛿𝑡 that minimize the total 
sum of squared errors ( ∑𝜖𝑖𝑡2  ). The value of 𝛾 is the treatment effect and is of primary interest for 
this analysis; it is interpreted as the average percent change in capacity factor for wind plants in 
the MISO region caused by the start of the MISO market. The 𝛾 values are reported in Table 1.6 
in the first row. Treatment effects for four different model specifications are added in each 
successive column to the right. 
Table 1.6 Model results 
 
1.7.1. Interpretation 
Each of the four model specifications estimates a positive effect on capacity factors from 
the MISO market treatment, ranging from 1.7 – 2.8 percentage points. The associated 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the treatment effect 
estimates. Rows two through four of Table 1.6 describe the model specification associated with 
each column. Firm-level correlation of wind capacity factors might exist if firms that own 
multiple wind farms have differentiated scheduling strategies for their wind. This could lead to 
firm-level heteroscedasticity that biases our inference. To address this possibility, I cluster 
standard errors at the firm-level; my sample includes 98 firms. 

















Month FE’s No No Yes Yes 
Plant FE’s No No No Yes 
Observations 2,248 2,240 2,240 2,240 
Standard errors clustered by firm. 
*** p < 0.01,   ** p < 0.05,   * p < 0.10 
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The 1.72 coefficient reported in column 1 is an estimate of the treatment effect based 
solely off the differences between treatment and control groups, with no additional controls. By 
design, it is equal to the 1.7 difference calculation explained at the end of section 1.5.1. The 
second column reports the result after controlling for historic monthly wind speeds. The increase 
in average capacity factor to 2.56 is consistent with the logic explained in section 1.5.2; since the 
control region was windier than the treatment region in the year following the market launch, we 
expect the estimate in column 1 omitting this variable to be negatively biased. Column 3 adds 
monthly fixed effects, to control for seasonal trends, which caused a slight increase in the 
estimated treatment effect, to 2.76. In the fourth column we add plant fixed effects and see an  
additional increase in the estimated treatment effect along with an increase in standard errors. 
1.7.2. Robustness checks 
Longer sample period 
 These results were calculated based off a data sample limited to one year before and after 
the MISO market launch, or April 2004 – April 2006. This sample was analyzed because the 
operational benefits to wind were expected to be realized as soon as the market launched, when 
the centralized and more granular dispatch reforms took place. Analyzing a sample over a longer 
time range increases the possibility of unobserved factors confounding the results. Nevertheless, 
increasing the sample size to include wind generation from April 2003 through March 2007 and 
estimating the full fixed effects model still yields a treatment coefficient of 2.34. with a standard 
error of 1.42, significant at the 90% level. This provides evidence of a sustained long-term effect 
of the MISO market on wind generation. 
Smaller sample footprint 
 The treatment and control groups shown in Figure 1.4 were constructed to balance a need 
to make the sample region small enough to minimize geographic heterogeneity, but big enough 
to include enough plants for sufficient statistical power. The area chosen spans the central region 
of the U.S. with a similarly large wind resource. However, some states in the control region are 
multiple states away from the MISO market, increasing the risk of unobserved factors in the 
control group biasing the results. The model was re-estimated over a smaller geographic area, 
including the states near the western edge of the MISO region where the wind resource is 
greatest- Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Nebraska, Montana, 
Missouri, and Kansas. Shrinking the size of the region in this way had little effect on the 
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estimated treatment effect, resulting in a coefficient of 2.80. However, restricting the sample in 
this way reduced the statistical power of the model, increasing the standard errors to 1.84, so that 
the estimate loses statistical significance. All sensitivity results are included in Table 7 in 
Appendix 1.9.2 
Stable unit treatment value assumption 
 Another concern in this analysis is if the stable unit treatment value assumption 
(SUTVA) is violated. If the MISO market affected wind dispatch in the control group then this 
would bias the estimates. For example, increased dispatch of wind in the MISO footprint could 
crowd the transmission system of the neighboring region, causing decreased wind dispatch on 
the other side of the MISO border, and our effect would be biased upwards. To check for 
possible SUTVA violations we examine more closely the subgroup of wind plants immediately 
across the border from MISO in Eastern Nebraska, and compare to wind plants farther away 
from the MISO border in western Nebraska and Wyoming. There was no conclusive evidence of 
SUTVA violations found, more detail is provided in section 1.7. 
Wind speed control 
Using average monthly wind speed as a control variable does not consider the fact that 
generation is not linear in wind speed. In reality, the relationship between wind speed and wind 
generation is cubic. Also, if wind speed is below a certain minimum  or above a maximum, the 
turbine will be unable to generate. To address this potential issue, we calculate a predicted 
generation variable for each month using the average wind speed, plant size, and a generic 
commercial wind turbine power curve model obtained from Otherpower, a consulting firm. The 
wind power curve for a 1 MW turbine is displayed in Figure 1.5. 
The proportion of time spent at each wind speed (𝑚𝑝ℎ) is determined from the measured 
average wind speed ( 𝑚𝑝ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) using equation 1.2: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑝ℎ = 𝜋2 ∗ 𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑚𝑝ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅2 ∗ 𝑒−𝜋4∗(𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑚𝑝ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)2  (1.2) 
For example, if the monthly average wind speed was 10 mph, the proportion of hours across 





Figure 1.5 Generic commercial wind turbine power curve. 
 
Figure 1.6 Distribution of wind speeds for 10 mph monthly average. 
 
Using the normalized power curve in Figure 1.5 combined with plant capacity, as well 
the hourly wind speed distribution calculated from equation 1.2 with the measured monthly 
average wind speed, I calculate monthly predicted generation values for every plant in the 
sample. This variable does a better job of explaining observed generation than average wind 
speed alone; a bivariate regression of observed generation on predicted generation yields an 𝑅2 
value of 0.84. However, including predicted generation in the main regression specification 
results in very little change to the treatment estimate, resulting in a coefficient estimate of 2.77 
with a standard error of 1.56. These results are displayed in the table in Appendix 1.9.2. 
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Wind speed correlations across treatment and control groups 
 Because wind plants are located at varying distances from the nearest weather 
measurement station, the correlations between plant capacity factors and measured wind speed 
will vary across plants. If these correlations are systematically different between the treatment 
and control groups, the treatment effect would be biased even after controlling for wind speed. 
To test for this, I included an interaction term between wind speed and the treatment group 
indicator. In this regression the coefficient on wind speed is 2.53, not significantly different from 
the specification without the interaction term. Importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term 
is statistically no different from zero (0.11 with a standard error of 0.26). This indicates no 
significant difference between the average correlation of wind speed and capacity factor between 
the treatment and control group. 
To compare the correlations between plant capacity factor and nearby measured wind 
speeds, local plants’ capacity factors were regressed on local wind speed for each of the 55 
weather stations in the sample, and the distributions between treatment and control groups were 
compared. Figure 1.7 shows no meaningful difference in the distributions of correlations across 
treatment and control groups. Thus, I am confident that different correlations between measured 
wind speed and nearby plant capacity factors did not bias the results.  
1.7.3. Visualizing results 
Figure 1.8 plots average capacity factors by month for wind plants in the treatment and 
control groups. The chart shows seasonal variation by month, which is controlled for in the 
model with the month fixed effects. In addition to these sources of variation, the treatment group 
has lower capacity factors than the control group prior to the market start date, and then higher 
values after. This is notable since the NOAA data shows the control region was slightly windier 















Of concern is the low average capacity factor in the treatment group in September of 
2004. The treatment effect could be inflated if the months leading up to the MISO market were a 
historic low in wind generation for reasons other than not having a competitive market. A 
version of Figure 1.8 with a longer time series from 2000-2010 is in Appendix 1.9.3. This chart 
shows that drops in average capacity factor during the fall months is typical in the longer time 
series, however the dip in 2004 is the lowest in the longer sample. If this drop is not fully 
explained by the control variables, and is not due to congestion resulting from not having a 
competitive market, then the treatment effect estimate with the 2004-2006 sample would be 
inflated. The “bigger sample” sensitivity test reported in Appendix 1.9.2 suggests this effect to 
be minimal, dropping from 2.84 to 2.34 percentage points with a larger sample. The 2004-2006 
sample was chosen for the main specifications because it covers a time period without major 
changes to renewable portfolio standard laws nor major market restructuring besides MISO in 
the study region. 
Figure 1.9 displays the average residuals by treatment and control region from a 
regression of capacity factor on wind speed. This can be interpreted as plotting the average 
deviation in capacity factor from the expected value after taking into consideration local wind 
speed. Controlling for wind speed in this way produces more similar pre-treatment trends and a 
larger increase in MISO plant capacity factors after the market began relative to the control 
group, compared to Figure 8. 
Figure 1.10 plots the coefficients of an interaction between the treatment group and year-
month indicator variables after controlling for wind speed. This approach has the benefit of 
yielding standard errors around the averages. Specifically, the points represent the estimated 𝛾𝑡 
coefficients and their associated standard errors from the following specification, where 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑖 
equals 1 for plants that are located in the MISO region: 
 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑡+(𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑖 ∗ 𝛿𝑡) + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (2) 
This chart shows a statistically significant increase in capacity factors in March 2005, 
even though the market didn’t officially launch until April. This is likely due to MISO trial 
operations that began in March with the purpose of testing market dispatch without holding 
participants liable for any costs due to unforeseen market issues. U.S. FERC describes in more 





Figure 1.9 Plot of average residuals from capacity factor regressed on wind speed, by treatment 
and control groups. Vertical line presents start of the MISO market. 
 
 
Figure 1.10 Treatment coefficients over time. 
 
1.8. SUTVA Analysis 
This section describes a sensitivity analysis to check for evidence of violation of the 
stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). It is possible that changes in wind dispatch in 
the MISO market affected dispatch of wind plants on the other side of the border in the control 
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group, which would bias our treatment estimate. Our approach to test for this problem involves 
examining capacity factors for the subgroup of wind plants in eastern Nebraska, near the large 
concentration of wind plants in western Iowa and southwestern Minnesota. These are compared 
to nearby wind plants that are farther from the border, in western Nebraska and Wyoming. If 
changes from the MISO market affected plants in the control group we would expect to see a 
bigger effect in the plants closer to the market border in eastern Nebraska. 
 Figure 1.11 presents the results of the SUTVA sensitivity test. The charts plot deviations 
from expected capacity factors by month for each control region subgroup. Specifically, these 
are the coefficients on the 𝛿𝑡 monthly fixed effects term from the model: 
 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (3) 
for the plants in each subgroup. The charts do not show any notable change around the time the 
MISO market began in April 2005 for plants in Eastern Nebraska. The wind plants in Western 
Nebraska and Wyoming show a temporary decrease shortly after the market began. This could 
be unexplained noise. There were only 11 wind plants operating in Nebraska and Wyoming at 
this time. We would expect system changes from the MISO market to spillover to the eastern 
plants primarily, since they are closer to the MISO border. However, there is no systematic 
change in measured capacity factors for the eastern Nebraska plants around the start of the MISO 
market. Despite this, it is possible that the decrease in output starting in May 2005 from plants in 
Western Nebraska and Wyoming was due to the MISO market. The increase in wind plants in 
MISO may have crowded out transmission capacity for neighboring non-MISO wind plants. This 
effect would bias the treatment effect upward, but is a relatively minor effect because most 
control group wind plants were not in neighboring states. Only about 10% of the total control 
group wind capacity were in states that share a border with MISO, which include Montana, 












This paper provides statistical evidence supporting the hypothesis that competitive 
electricity markets managed by independent system operators are beneficial for wind energy. 
The econometric models employed indicate the start of the MISO market increased capacity 
factors for wind plants in its region by 1.7-2.8 percentage points, relative to similar plants not in 
the market. The model is robust to multiple potentially confounding variables, including wind 
speed and technology variation across plants. I demonstrate larger regional integration as one 
mechanism explaining the effect of market structure on wind generation, although other 
mechanisms may also be contributing to observed changes in wind generation. Electricity policy 
makers in areas of increasing wind penetration should consider expanding the market geography 
through an independent system operator as a strategy to managing higher intermittency of 
generation. Areas of future research involve formalizing effects from other mechanisms of 
market integration such as the impact of more granular dispatch intervals on wind generation and 
improved congestion management, and determining the relative importance of each mechanism. 
More recent expansions of electricity markets into wind rich areas in the United States provide 
new opportunities for empirical testing of these hypotheses, and are promising areas for 
additional further research. This research informs ongoing efforts to expand wholesale electricity 
markets in the United States as a strategy to integrate more renewable energy. 
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1.10.  Appendix 
1.10.1. Plants with observations removed in data cleaning 
Table 1.7 Plants with observations removed in data cleaning. 
 
Plant name Plant in 
MISO? 
Notes on removed 
observations 
Agassiz Beach LLC Yes 6 observations in 2003 
Allendorf Yes 12 observations in 2004 
Autumn Hills LLC Yes 12 observations in 2004 
Florence Hills LLC Yes 12 observations in 2004 
Foote Creek IV No 12 observations in 2004 
Hadley Ridge LLC Yes 12 observations in 2004 
Hope Creek LLC Yes 12 observations in 2004 
Jack River LLC Yes 12 observations in 2004 
Jessica Mills LLC Yes 12 observations in 2004 
Julia Hills LLC Yes 12 observations in 2004 
Minwind I Yes 12 observations in 2003 
Ruthton Ridge LLC Yes 12 observations in 2004 
Soliloquoy Ridge LLC Yes 12 observations in 2004 




1.10.2. Sensitivity results 






























Wind speeds Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Monthly FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Plant FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3033 1481 2240 1636 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors in parentheses 




1.10.3. Time series of average capacity factors 
 












CONSUMER SAVINGS, PRICE, AND EMISSIONS IMPACTS OF INCREASING DEMAND 
RESPONSE IN THE MIDCONTINENT ELECTRICITY MARKET 
Modified from a paper originally published in The Energy Journal7 
Steve Dahlke, Matt Prorok8 
2.1. Abstract 
This paper estimates consumer savings, CO2 emissions reductions, and price effects from 
increasing demand response (DR) dispatch in the Midcontinent Independent System Operator 
(MISO) electricity market. To quantify market effects, we develop a dynamic supply and 
demand model to explore a range of DR deployment scenarios. The study is motivated by the 
existence of regulatory and market rule barriers to market-based deployment of DR resources in 
the MISO region. We show annual consumer savings from increased market-based DR can vary 
from $1.3 million to $17.6 million under typical peak operating conditions, depending on the 
amount of DR resources available for market dispatch and the frequency of deployment. 
Consumer savings and other market effects increase exponentially during atypical periods with 
tight supply and high prices. Additionally, we find that DR deployment often reduces CO2 
emissions, but the magnitude of emissions reductions varies depending on the emissions content 
of marginal generation at the time and location of deployment. The results of this study suggest 
regulators and other stakeholders should focus policy efforts to reducing regulatory barriers to 
DR deployment in wholesale markets, particularly in locations that experience high price spikes, 
to improve market efficiency and achieve cost savings for consumers. 
2.2.Introduction 
A significant challenge associated with the development of wholesale electricity markets 
is the lack of demand-side participation. In most electricity markets, consumers face static prices 
that often do not change over the course of days, weeks, and months, while the costs to supply 
electricity change significantly across these time scales. The result is a mismatch between real-
time market conditions and retail prices that causes over-consumption during high-price periods 
and under-consumption during low-price periods [18], [19]. This inefficiency increases spot 
                                                 
7 Reproduced with permission from The Energy Journal 40 no. 3 (2019), International Association for Energy 
Economics, 10.5547/01956574.40.3.sdah, Co-authored with Matt Prorok. 
 
8Senior Policy Manager, Great Plains Institute 
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price volatility, makes it more difficult for operators to manage physical constraints, and 
increases vulnerability to the exercise of market power [20]. In the MISO region there is a 
significant potential for electricity demand response that is largely unmet [21]. Barriers in the 
region include state regulatory hesitancy and wholesale market rules designed for large 
centralized power generation [22]. These regulatory barriers keep economic demand response 
resources out of the wholesale energy market, creating an inefficiency that leads to artificially 
high prices. 
This paper quantifies wholesale consumer savings and other impacts of increasing 
economic demand response (DR) dispatch in the MISO energy market using a bottom-up9 hourly 
supply and demand model for the Midcontinent Independent System Operator  wholesale 
electricity market (also referred to as Midcontinent ISO, or MISO; in the remainder of the paper 
we will use the acronym MISO). The MISO market spans 15 U.S. states and facilitates trade 
across 65,000 miles of electric transmission and between 200 gigawatts of electricity generation. 
We model DR dispatch across three different MISO subregions, North, Central, and South, 
defined in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 MISO market and subregions [24] 
                                                 
9“Bottom-up” means we rely on historic generator-level and DR program data to build supply curves, and historic 
demand data to construct demand curves. Conversely, a “top-down” modeling approach may involve constructing a 
model using market-wide summary statistics and representative technical and cost assumptions. See Rivers & 
Jaccard [23] for further discussion of differences between top-down and bottom-up modeling approaches in the 
context of energy modeling. 
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We use historic data to simulate market effects from dispatching a range of existing DR 
resources that are currently out of the market. All datasets and code for this analysis, as well as 
online appendices, are publicly available on the Open Science Framework repository available at 
https://osf.io/6r5cw/. Our study is not the first to show energy market benefits from increased DR 
[25]–[28]. However, as discussed in Cappers et al. [22], DR in the MISO market is shaped by a 
unique set of state-jurisdictional regulatory and market rule challenges that do not exist in other 
competitive wholesale markets, warranting a region-specific study. We make several 
contributions to the literature. First, we estimate market effects from increased DR dispatch for 
the MISO market, the largest power system in the United States by geographic scope and one of 
the largest electricity markets in the world. Second, we fill a gap in the energy literature 
characterized by a lack of studies on incentive-based DR. Third, we apply microeconomic theory 
to model the costs and benefits of dispatching incentive-based DR in a wholesale electricity 
market using a net-benefits criteria, described in section 2.2.2. Finally, we combine DR data 
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) with ISO market data in a dynamic 
supply and demand simulation model. Other novel characteristics of this study include 
estimating wholesale DR market offers from EIA data, calculating the sensitivity of results to a 
range of DR energy shifting assumptions, and producing estimates of carbon emissions impacts 
for various DR deployment scenarios.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we define and classify DR 
for the purposes of our analysis, and motivate our research design and modeling strategy. In 
section 2.3 we describe the methodology and data used for the analysis. In section 2.4 we present 
our results, and in section 2.5 we conclude with a summary of results and subsequent policy 
recommendations. Our modeling shows how increasing cost-effective DR dispatch can generate 
consumer savings net of system costs by lowering prices under typical peak operating conditions. 
We also show how the market impacts of DR increase exponentially when deployed during 
critical peak operating conditions. 
2.3. Motivation 
2.3.1. Background 
Demand response in electricity markets encompasses a range of market participant 
activities, programs, and technologies. DR can be classified into two broad categories, according 
to definitions adopted by the U.S. Department of Energy, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
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Commission (FERC), and numerous academic articles [29]–[31]. The first category of DR is 
defined as “changes in electricity usage by end-use customers from their normal consumption 
patterns in response to changes in price.” These types of demand response resources are referred 
to as price-based programs, and encompass electricity price structures designed to change over 
time including time-of-use (TOU), critical-peak-pricing (CPP), and real-time-pricing (RTP) 
programs. The second category is defined as “incentive payments designed to induce lower 
electricity use at times of high wholesale market prices or when system reliability is in 
jeopardy.” These resources are referred to as incentive-based programs and include direct load 
control (DLC) and interruptible/curtailable (I/C) load programs.  
The MISO region of the United States historically has had a higher proportion of DR 
relative to total load compared to other regions in the United States for several important reasons. 
First, some states in the region require utilities to invest a percentage or two of revenue from 
retail sales in DR programs. Second, utilities in the region have historically had favorable 
resource adequacy rules that allow load management to be counted towards meeting reserve 
requirements, generating savings or revenues from the DR even if it is never deployed. Third, the 
customer base in this region has a significant fraction of industrial load that is amenable to 
interruption [32]. EIA reports that utilities in MISO have 4.4 GW of DR [33], while MISO 
reports they have 5.7 GW of DR resources available [34]. This discrepancy is largely due to the 
fact that EIA’s DR survey form covers electric retail utilities, and not large end-use customers 
that register their DR program directly with MISO. 
Despite a large portion of DR in the MISO region, the resources are deployed at a much 
lower frequency than the rest of the country. For example, in 2015 only 22% of the available DR 
resources in the MISO market were deployed, compared to 42% in the rest of the country [33]. 
In California, a particularly active market for DR, 64% of available resources were deployed. 
During the few occasions when DR resources in the MISO are deployed, they are often done so 
by individual utilities outside of the MISO market, and show up to the market operator as 
unexpected load reductions. However, the large majority of DR is available for direct 
deployment by MISO up to at least 5 times per summer through a product category called a 
“Load Modifying Resource” (LMR). LMRs do not directly participate in the energy market and 
are only called on during grid emergencies. However, many LMR resources are “economic” 
during peak periods in that they have a lower marginal cost of dispatch than the generators in the 
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energy market that get dispatched ahead of them. MISO has an energy DR program available but 
participation is negligible due to market rule and regulatory barriers. 
MISO has historically underutilized the DR assets available to it. Since the launch of 
MISO’s energy markets in 2005, MISO has only deployed its registered DR under the LMR 
asset classification twice at the time of writing. On April 4th, 2017 during a maximum generation 
event triggered by unseasonably high temperatures, MISO called on just over 700 MWs of 
LMRs in the southern portion of its footprint [35]. The only other deployment in MISO’s history 
we have record of was in 2006 [36].  
Various market and state regulatory barriers prevent better DR participation in the MISO 
market. MISO’s rules for economic Demand Response Resources require a minimum size 
threshold of at least 1 megawatt to participate in the market10 [37], [38].  Additionally, MISO’s 
rules make it difficult to aggregate small DR resources to meet the minimum size threshold.11 
This prevents many demand response resources from entering the market. Other markets that 
have more active DR participation, including PJM and ISO New England, have corresponding 
minimum size thresholds of 0.1 MW and do allow aggregation of resources across pricing nodes. 
The second reason for low DR participation in MISO is state regulatory resistance to giving up 
control of regulated DR assets in the competitive market. As a result, regulators often will not let 
utilities enter their DR assets into the wholesale markets, and most states in the MISO region 
have banned commercial activity by third party DR aggregators [22]. More information on 
regulatory and technical reasons why demand-side management programs have underdelivered 
in wholesale electricity markets around the world are provided by Wirl [39] and Rivers and 
Jaccard [40]. 
2.3.2. Modeling DR in wholesale markets 
In this section we develop a general microeconomic model that is applied to understand 
the effects of deploying incentive-based DR in a wholesale electricity market under a net-
benefits criterion. First, it is important to clarify that consumers in the wholesale market are often 
                                                 
10 In order for any resource to set prices in the market it must be both eligible to provide specific market services and 
be included in MISO’s Network Model. Demand Response Resources (DRR) – Type II must be at least 1 MW to be 
included in the Network Model. DRR-Type I do not have this same requirement, but are only modelled as load in 
the Network Model and thus are not able to set market clearing prices. Instead they may only participate as a price 
taker.  
11 For DR providing energy and reserve services, MISO prevents aggregation across local balancing authority areas, 
and for DR providing regulation service, MISO presents aggregation across economic pricing nodes. 
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electric utilities or third-party intermediaries purchasing energy on behalf of their customers. In 
some cases, large users of electricity will bypass the utility and purchase energy directly from the 
wholesale market. All these entities can provide demand response in the wholesale market.12 A 
utility demand response program in the wholesale market is typically an aggregation of the 
utility’s customers who are able to provide reliable energy reductions when it is cost-effective to 
do so. The details of the financial arrangements between utilities and their retail customers, 
including incentives offered to DR consumers for participation, as well as what happens with the 
wholesale revenue earned by the utility, are not included in our model. These retail arrangements 
can vary by utility and customer, they occur downstream of the wholesale model, and are out of 
scope for this study. In the model we assume a competitive wholesale market so that DR 
resources offer into the market at the marginal cost of energy reduction. This includes the cost to 
the consumer of not using the electricity, plus marginal costs associated with administering the 
energy reduction. In reality, market participants may violate this assumption by acting non-
competitively or may be constrained from acting competitively by regulations. 
Aggregate wholesale electricity demand is inelastic to the wholesale price and a function 
of an exogenous fixed retail price 𝑃𝑟 and a demand shifting parameter 𝐴𝑡 , represented by 𝐷(𝑃𝑟 , 𝐴𝑡). 𝐴𝑡 varies exogenously through time due to external factors such as weather and 
changing consumer preferences. We assume generators are competitive and offer into the market 
until price falls below their marginal cost of production. 𝑆𝑡(𝑃, ?̅?) provides the aggregate market 
supply at price 𝑃 with total supply capacity ?̅?. The quantity cleared in the market is equal to the 
amount demanded at the fixed retail price 𝑃𝑟, so that 𝑄 = 𝐷(𝑃𝑟 , 𝐴𝑡). If generators are stacked by 
their marginal cost so that the lowest-cost generator is deployed first, the wholesale market 
clearing price is determined by the marginal cost of the last generator required to meet market 
demand 𝑄, so that 𝑄 = 𝑆(𝑃𝑤, ?̅?). In the short term, 𝑄 is inefficiently high when 𝑃𝑤 > 𝑃𝑟, and 
inefficiently low when 𝑃𝑤 < 𝑃𝑟, generating dead-weight loss (DWL).  
Incentive-based DR programs involve payments to customers in exchange for energy 
reductions. Current federal regulations in the United States require DR in wholesale markets to 
be compensated the same as electric generators providing a similar energy service [41]. An 
incentive-based DR deployment in the market can be modeled by a leftward shift in the market 
                                                 




demand curve to 𝐷(𝑃𝑟 , 𝐴𝑡) − 𝐷𝑅 as shown in Figure 2.2. Now the market clearing quantity is 𝑄2 = 𝑄1 − 𝐷𝑅, and the new wholesale price 𝑃𝑤2 is equal to the marginal cost of the last 
generator needed to supply 𝑄2. The price reduction generates consumer savings equal to 𝑄2 × (𝑃𝑤1 − 𝑃𝑤2). Since regulations require that DR providers be compensated at the wholesale 
price, there are still 𝑄1 resources receiving payment 𝑃𝑤2,13 but only 𝑄2 electricity consumers 
purchasing at 𝑃𝑤2. This creates a market revenue shortfall equal to 𝑃𝑤2 × (𝑄1 − 𝑄2), the revenue 
owed to DR providers (labeled “DR Revenue” in Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2 Incentive-based DR deployment modeled as a shift in demand 
 
The fact that consumer savings from DR deployment are offset by the revenue owed to 
DR providers is known as the billing effect. The revenue shortfall is typically socialized as a 
charge applied proportionately to the remaining wholesale consumers. If DR revenue exceeds 
consumer savings, costs will outweigh the benefits of DR deployment. FERC regulations require 
that consumer savings be greater than revenue to DR consumers, so that non-DR consumers still 
experience a net-benefit from DR deployment. The situation in which consumer savings equals 
DR revenue is known as the net-benefits threshold, below which DR cannot be deployed (FERC, 
2011). Any demand reduction that occurs when the market equilibrium is at an inelastic portion 
of the supply curve will yield more consumer savings then revenue owed to DR owners and pass 
the net benefits test. Our analysis is designed to ensure that all DR deployments that occur in the 
simulations satisfy the net benefits test. 
                                                 
13 This consists of 𝑄1 − 𝑄2 DR resources and 𝑄2 generation resources receiving 𝑃𝑤2. 
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Because incentive DR programs are compensated at the wholesale price like a generator, 
market operators treat DR like generators in that they are dispatched as part of the supply stack. 
In this case, DR dispatch can be equivalently modeled as a rightward shift in supply, shown in 
Figure 2.3. In this model, DR resources prior to being dispatch are equivalent to negative supply, 
so the original supply curve is left of the market supply curve presented in Figure 2.2. 𝑄1 is the 
quantity that would clear if DR was not included as a supply resource and instead added back to 
the demand curve. 𝑄2 is the market clearing quantity with DR included. Since in this case DR is 
scheduled as supply, 𝐷(𝑃𝑟 , 𝐴𝑡) does not include the demand reserved as DR capacity. As in the 
previous case, consumer savings are equivalent to 𝑄2 × (𝑃𝑤1 − 𝑃𝑤2), and the revenue owed to 
DR providers is equal to 𝑃𝑤2 × (𝑄1 − 𝑄2).  
 
Figure 2.3 Incentive-based DR deployment modeled as a shift in supply. 
 
2.3.3. Why model incentive-based DR? 
Most incentive-based DR programs in the U.S. were developed starting in the 1980’s due 
to a significant increase in air-conditioning load, which increased the need for peaking capacity 
relative to non-peak. Many regulated utilities invested in incentive-based DR as a lower-cost 
alternative to peaking generators [42]. At the time, metering technology required to implement 
price-based DR was not available. After significant incentive-based DR investments in the 
1980’s and 1990’s, the FERC assumed jurisdiction via a congressional mandate and began 
working to remove barriers to DR participation in wholesale markets [43]. Now, advanced 
metering technology to enable price-based DR is available, however the prevalence of price 
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responsive demand remains small primarily due to an unwillingness by state regulators to expose 
retail customers to uncertain prices [20]. 
Economists disagree on the effectiveness of compensating incentive-based DR at the 
wholesale price as current regulations require. Some claim that wholesale payments for energy 
reductions inflate price signals because customers are ‘double-compensated’ for their reduction, 
as DR participants benefit both from the savings from not purchasing electricity and the 
wholesale market payment [44]. Others worry that incentive-based DR will crowd out true price 
response [20]. Additionally, they point out incentive-based DR consumers may game the market 
and inflate pre-reduction consumption baselines if proper rules are not implemented [45]. Some 
do note that concerns about improper baselines can be mitigated by properly structured market 
rules, as outlined by Chao & Depillis [46]. 
Proponents of incentive-based DR in wholesale markets point out it is a second-best 
solution that, in the absence of price-responsive demand, moves market prices closer to the 
efficient level. Additionally, implementing a price-based DR program includes upfront costs that 
in many cases exceed the benefits to the customer [47]. In a market with static retail rates, failing 
to deploy DR resources when the market clearing price exceeds the marginal cost of demand 
reduction results in a market inefficiency [48]. This is the case in the MISO market, leading to 
inefficiently high prices and extra costs for consumers. Moreover, there is a gap in the literature 
with respect to studies on incentive-based DR. A recent literature review analyzed 117 studies on 
DR modeling, and concluded: 
there is a clear lack of models addressing incentive-based DR programs. This is 
somewhat astonishing given the fact that, in the U.S., DLC and I/C programs are applied 
more frequently than TOU or RTP programs. The majority of studies focus on price-
based programs [49]. 
Furthermore, there is currently a large fleet of underutilized incentive-based DR assets in the 
MISO region that are not comprehensively integrated into the wholesale energy market, 
described previously in section 2.2.1. Despite concerns from some economists with respect to 
incentive-based DR, we analyze effects of increasing participation of incentive-based DR in the 
MISO market because, 1) there is a much bigger penetration of incentive-based DR currently in 
existence relative to price-based DR, 2) these resources are underutilized and not 
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comprehensively integrated into wholesale markets, especially in MISO, and 3) there is a lack of 
studies in the literature focused on incentive-based DR. 
2.4. Methodology 
2.4.1. Overview 
The purpose of our modeling exercise is to estimate consumer savings, emissions 
impacts, and price effects from increasing DR dispatch in the MISO energy market. We do this 
for a range of scenarios that explore differences in DR dispatch amounts, frequencies, energy 
shifting effects, and energy offer prices. Our modeling approach consists of a dynamic supply 
and demand model that varies hourly, where the market clearing prices and quantities are 
determined by the intersection of the two curves. This is similar to the model applied in 
Buzoianu et al. [50], except in our case supply curves are constructed bottom-up from historical 
generator-level offers data obtained from MISO. Demand curves in the model are based off 
hourly historic MISO demand data and are assumed to be inelastic. We assume inelastic demand 
because the large majority of electricity customers in the MISO region face retail rates that are 
fixed in the short-term and do not adjust when wholesale prices change. We use 2015 market and 
DR data because it is the most recent year in which demand response data is available from the 
EIA at the time of writing. DR resources in MISO are categorized with respective shares of total 
DR capacity as residential (35%), commercial (20%), and industrial (45%). Residential and 
commercial DR programs primarily include control of customers’ electric heating and cooling 
systems. Industrial DR programs varies by customer and involve agreements for temporary 
interruption of manufacturing or production processes. The Midwest has a large amount of 
industrial electricity consumption across several industries, led by primary metal manufacturing. 
Additionally, real-time instead of day-ahead MISO market data are used since the real-
time market is used as a ‘true-up’ to balance unexpected deviations from day-ahead predictions 
and scheduling. Furthermore, real-time prices more accurately reflect historic system conditions, 
and are the final prices used to settle transactions in the energy market. Because our bottom-up 
supply curves are discontinuous, we use an iterative solver-based approach to calculate the 
market equilibrium for each hour and market region, programmed in the R statistical computing 
language. We model supply and demand for every hour of 2015 for the three MISO regions 
defined in Figure 2.1: North, Central, and South. This is motivated by recent empirical work 
finding sub regional variation in price responsiveness within the MISO region [51]. Our 
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analytical approach quantifies market clearing price and quantity effects from dispatching DR 
and compares them to baseline outcomes that occurred without DR. 
The model scenarios dispatch DR based on resource quantities and marginal cost 
estimates for existing DR resources located in the MISO region that do not participate in the 
energy market.14 Since most DR resources in the MISO region are registered through the market 
under the ‘Load Modifying Resources’ (LMR) category, our model dispatch constraints are 
based on MISO’s LMR operating agreement [36]. LMR contracts require DR resources to be 
available for up to 5 deployments during the summer season for a minimum of 4 hours per 
deployment [37]. Because many DR programs are available for dispatch more than 5 
deployments per year and not necessarily limited to summer months15, we simulate additional 
scenarios that dispatch DR up to 20 times per year and outside of summer months when it is 
economic to do so. 
 Since the number of DR deployments per year is constrained, DR should be deployed on 
days with both high prices and energy demand in order to maximize value. To determine the 
highest value days in 2015, we use a similar approach to The Brattle Group [52] and rank the 
highest value days according to the price-load product for 4-hour dispatch blocks. Specifically, 
we multiply the average price and demand for each hour in 2015 and calculate 4-hour moving 
averages. We then select the days that have the highest price-load product average to determine 
the most valuable days for DR dispatch, eliminating duplicate days. Because we model scenarios 
that limit DR dispatch to summer months as well as scenarios that model DR dispatch year-
round, we compile two lists of 20 highest-value days from 2015, one for the entire year and the 
other restricted to the summer month. These lists are provided in online appendix 1, publicly 
available at the link provided in section 2.1.  
2.4.2. Costs 
A key input for the supply-demand model is resource-level energy offers, measured in 
dollars per megawatt-hour ($/MWh). These are the supply offers from which the market operator 
schedules least cost dispatch. In section 2.2 we describe that market rule and regulatory barriers 
currently inhibit a competitive DR market in MISO. In contrast, our modeling effort is designed 
                                                 
14 Except for the few events described in section 2. 
15 Cappers et al. notes that incentive-based DR programs have historically been designed for between 8-20 
deployments per year [22]. 
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to explore the effects of a more competitive market. In a competitive market, DR is assumed to 
offer energy reductions at the marginal cost of deployment. In the absence of marginal cost data, 
DR energy offers are estimated to be a function of the cost incurred by the underlying electricity 
customers for service interruption, which varies by customer.16 To estimate DR energy offers, we 
use utility-reported data from the EIA on DR customer incentive costs. Customer incentive costs 
are defined as the total financial value provided to a customer for their program participation, 
including direct payments, lowered tariff rates, in-kind services, or other benefits [53]. 
Customers that have a high cost of electricity interruption will demand high incentive payments, 
and have a lower likelihood of deployment [31]. The distribution of energy offer estimates is 
displayed in Figure 2.4. 3% of MISO DR programs had offer cost estimates above $200/MWh, 
which are omitted from the figure to eliminate scaling issues, a portion of these were at the offer 
cap of $2000/MWh. As shown in the chart, about one third of MISO DR resources have low 
energy offer estimates between $0/MWh and $10/MWh. The remaining distribution is spread 
about evenly between $10/MWh and $200/MWh. Further details on the DR energy offer 
estimation methods are provided in online appendix 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 DR resource by estimated energy offers, MISO region. 
 
Our energy offer estimates are compared to historic DR offers in the PJM market, which 
has active energy market DR participation [54]. In 2015, economic demand response resources 
                                                 
16 For example, a hospital may have a greater cost of electricity interruption than an office building. 
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in the PJM market provided over 121,000 MWhs of supply. Demand response bids during this 
year range between $0/MWh and $1,850/MWh. This range aligns well with the range of our 
marginal cost estimates, however the PJM DR offers are higher on average. This could be due to 
a number of factors, including higher costs of DR deployment in PJM compared to MISO, non-
competitive bidding behavior by DR providers, or under-estimated DR program costs provided 
by utility survey responses to the EIA. Due to higher energy offers from DR observed in PJM, 
we model sensitivity scenarios in which all energy offers in MISO are increased by 100%.  
2.4.3. Baseline model 
Hourly supply curves were constructed using historic MISO offers data. This data 
includes hourly price-quantity pairs for every generator offering into the MISO, anonymized to 
protect confidentiality. From this we construct hourly supply curves by region. We separate the 
model into MISO’s three operations regions: North, Central and South. Inelastic demand is 
included based on historic load data, and the intersection of supply and demand curves 
determines the market clearing price and quantity prediction for each hour and region. As an 




Figure 2.5 MISO system supply curve plus demand (vertical line) for the North region on July 
12, 2015 at 4pm. 
 
 Next, DR resources are added to the baseline model, assigning each DR resource to the 
corresponding region depending on that resource’s reported state. The baseline supply-demand 
model predicts hourly prices based on historic data. The model abstracts from other real-world 
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factors that also determine price, including transmission constraints, net imports, unforced 
outages, and forecast error. Sometimes these factors cause large price spikes that our model does 
not predict. To understand how often actual prices deviate from our model’s predictions we 
compare the model-predicted prices to actual historic prices. Plots of the hourly distributions of 
actual prices by subregion for the highest-value days modeled are provided in online appendix 3. 
Figure 2.6 shows the average predicted prices by hour versus average actual prices for the 
20 highest value days in the south region during the summer of 2015. These hourly averages are 
smoothed17 and weighted by daily demand. The model consistently under predicts prices during 
afternoon peak hours. Corresponding plots for the North and Central regions are provided in 
online appendix 4. Peak periods are when factors exogenous to our model including transmission 
constraints and forecast error are most pronounced and when we expect the model to under-
predict prices. We use historical price data to adjust the baseline model to better reflect the actual 
price levels throughout the day. The difference between the average actual price and the average 
predicted price for each region are used as hourly adjustment factors to calibrate the model’s 
predictions. This adjusts predicted prices upward during hours in which the model systematically 
under-predicts prices, and downward during hours that systematically over-predict prices.  
 
 
Figure 2.6 Average hourly prices predicted by model (solid line) versus actual prices (dashed 
line) during highest value summer days in 2015, south region. 
 
                                                 
17 We apply exponential smoothing to the actual hourly price series to minimize noise across hours. Hourly 
smoothing doesn’t materially affect modeling results since DR events are modeled in 4-hour blocks. 
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The deviation in prices is explained in part by economic theory related to market power 
in electricity markets. The model employed for this analysis implicitly assumes producers are 
offering resources at competitive prices. In the MISO market, competition is limited due to 
market entry barriers and transmission constraints. Most producers in MISO are vertically 
integrated across production and distribution. Bushnell et al. [55] show that firms acting 
strategically in such a market can lead to prices that are higher or lower than competitive levels, 
depending on the net sell versus buy positions of the vertically integrated firms in the wholesale 
market. During low-demand hours, vertically-integrated electricity firms that are net-buyers in 
the wholesale market are incentivized to produce below the competitive price to increase profits 
from their retail business. This pattern shows up in Figure 2.6, where observed prices are below 
the predicted competitive levels during low-demand periods, and above competitive levels 
during high demand periods. It occurs in markets like MISO where the dominant producers also 
have large retail obligations. Bushnell et al.’s work was based on a Cournot model of strategic 
market behavior where dominant firms choose quantity levels to maximize profits. In reality, 
firms choose supply curves of both quantities and prices. This supply function equilibrium (SFE) 
market model was developed by Klemperer and Meyer [56], and extended to electricity markets 
by Baldick et al. [57], who show the SFE model is bounded by the competitive and Cournot 
outcomes. This is all consistent with the patterns observed in MISO and displayed in Figure 2.6. 
The  empirically-derived adjustment factors address the deviation in observed prices and 
model-predicted competitive prices, leading to DR dispatch based on price-levels consistent with 
a market where firms are acting strategically. This approach remains internally consistent 
because most of our modeling results, including changes in consumer savings, emissions, and 
prices, are calculated as differences between scenarios with and without DR in the supply curve, 
all else equal. If we can assume that strategic market behavior in MISO does not drastically 
change after DR deployment, these adjustments made to absolute price levels will not bias the 
results. Rather, the adjustment factors allow for predicted market clearing prices that match 
historic prices with strategic behavior, and simulate levels of economic DR clearing the market 
based on realistic price levels. 
2.4.4. Energy shifting 
Aggregate effects on demand from DR dispatch consist of both a reduction and a shift in 
energy use. Demand shifting involves moving electricity use to off-peak periods, but doesn’t 
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involve a net reduction in energy use over time. Smith & Brown [58] find that on average, 16% 
of peak energy reduction from DR is shifted to off-peak periods. This value was derived from 
price-quantity elasticity estimates from a study that empirically measured the effects of a Duke 
Energy real-time pricing program over 8 years [59]. Modeling in De Jongh, Hobbs, & Bellmans  
assumes DR energy shifting ranges from 8% to 16% [60]. Furthermore, FERC’s Demand 
Response Impact and Value Estimation (DRIVE) model provides hourly impact profiles of DR 
programs. Examining the load shifting parameters in this model for residential programs, 
commercial/industrial (C/I) interruptible tariffs, and other large C/I programs, yields a weighted 
average energy shift value of 12.1% [61]. Burkhardt et al. [62] find almost no energy shifting by 
consumers in experimental results from a residential neighborhood in Texas with high electric 
vehicle penetration. In contrast, the EIA NEMS assumes DR energy shifting of 96%, although 
this parameter does not appear to be supported by empirical experimental evidence [58]. 
Drawing from this literature, our baseline scenario assumes 15% of DR energy reductions 
are shifted to off-peak hours. We also conduct sensitivity scenarios that assume 1) zero energy 
shifted to off-peak, and 2) 96% energy shifted to off-peak. We model DR reductions occurring 
during the last hour of the highest-value four-hour blocks plus the three preceding hours. The 
load shift is then modeled as an energy increase during the four hours following the DR 
reduction. In the occasional situations where DR deployment occurs during the late evening (HE 
19-23), we model the rebound during the hours preceding the event, assuming customers will 
anticipate the DR reduction instead of increasing energy use when most people are asleep. Since 
prices are similar on average before and after DR events, changing whether the energy shifting 
occurs before or after the DR event does not have a material impact on the aggregate market 
effects reported as results. 
2.4.5. Carbon emissions 
We estimate carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions effects for each model scenario. For 
confidentiality purposes, MISO’s generator offers data do not identify individual plants, so 
neither plant-level emissions nor fuel-type information is available. We approximate the carbon 
content of the marginal generation for each hour by using MISO’s real-time fuel on the margin 
data [63]. The data specifies the fuel of the marginal generator by region for every hour. 
Specifically, we multiply the hourly change in energy from DR (in MWh) by our estimate of the 
hourly CO2 emissions content of the marginal generator (in kg CO2/MWh).  We use national 
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averages of CO2 emissions rates per MWh by fuel type from the U.S. Department of Energy 
[64], provided in Table 2.1. Since the MISO fuel-type data does not break out natural gas plants 
by combined cycle or combustion turbine, and since data on dispatch frequency by generator 
type in MISO is not available, the emissions factor used for natural gas is a simple average of the 
combined cycle and combustion turbine emissions rates. It is possible that a reduction in DR 
could cause the marginal fuel type to switch, however we are unable to see when this would 
happen given limitations in publicly available data. Thus, our results should be treated as 
approximations of the CO2 emissions effects from DR dispatch. 
 




We calculate market savings, price effects, and emissions effects for several scenarios to 
understand how changes in several variables affect our results. The scenarios include variations 
on the following parameters: 
When to deploy DR. As discussed in section 2.3.1, LMR contracts only require DR to be 
available during the summer months (June 01 – August 31), however many DR resources in 
MISO can be deployed outside of the summer. We model scenarios with DR deployment 
occurring during the highest value hours in summer months, and another with deployment during 
the highest value days from the entire year. 
Frequency of deployment. As discussed in section 2.3.1., MISO’s DR contracts only 
require DR to be deployed up to 5 times per year, but DR programs are often designed to be 
deployed more than 5 times per year. In general, incentive-based DR programs are designed for 
8-20 deployments per year [22]. We model scenarios where DR is deployed 5 times per year, 10 
times per year, and 20 times per year. Note that deploying a DR resource more often will lower 
its average energy offer value necessary to recover program lifetime costs, which will lead to 
Fuel type 








reduced energy offers in a competitive market. As a result, increasing the frequency of DR 
deployment will lower DR offer cost estimates described in online appendix 2. As a result, 
increasing the frequency of DR dispatch will lower energy offer estimates, and more DR may 
clear at a given price. 
Amount of DR resources. The DR dataset obtained from the EIA reports 4,355 MW of 
DR registered in the MISO region. In contrast, MISO’s resource auction results for the 2015-16 
planning year indicate 5,745 MW of installed DR capacity [34]. We model a baseline scenario 
with the 4,355 MW of DR for which we have detailed cost data, and an expanded scenario with 
5,745 MW of DR. When scaling up DR to match the amount reported by MISO, we assign the 
DR to regions based on their relative regional shares as reported in the EIA data, displayed in 
Table 2.2, and assume energy offers for the expanded DR equal to the median values from the 
detailed EIA cost data. More details on the data cleaning process for this EIA dataset are 
provided in online appendix 5. 
Table 2.2 DR resources by region. 
 
 Demand shift. As discussed in section 2.3.4., we vary the demand shifting assumption 
from 0%, 15%, and 96%. 
Marginal costs. As mentioned in section 2.3.2., we model scenarios in which energy 
offer estimates are increased by 100%, due to the possibility that DR resources may offer into the 
market at higher prices than our estimates. 
In summary the following list describes the five parameters that are varied to produce 
sensitivity scenarios:  
• When to deploy DR 
1. Summer 
2. Year-round 
• Frequency of deployment 
Region DR (MW) Share 
Central 2074.0 0.48 
North 1791.3 0.41 
South 489.9 0.11 




1. 5 deployments per year 
2. 10 deployments per year 
3. 20 deployments per year 
• Amount of DR resources 
1. Base - 4,355 MW 
2. Expanded - 5,745 MW 
• Rebound effect 
1. Low - 0% 
2. Base - 15% 
3. High - 96% 
• Energy offers 
1. Baseline estimates 
2. Baseline estimates increased by 100% 
We vary these parameters to produce 30 simulations, the results of which are discussed next. 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Baseline scenario 
The parameter levels for the baseline scenario are listed below: 
• Summer-only deployment 
• 5 deployments per year 
• Base-level DR resources (4,355 MW) 
• Base-level rebound effect (15%) 
• Baseline energy offer estimates 
The results by region are provided in Table 2.3. In these and subsequent results, the dollar 
level values are rounded to the nearest $1,000 to provide a realistic perspective on the model’s 
precision. The results for the North and Central regions are more indicative of ‘typical’ peak 
operating conditions, while the South region results include an extreme price event. For example, 
the average adjusted predicted price during the peak hours in the baseline scenario for the North 
and Central regions was $43.57, and the maximum price observed was $62.56. The South region 
had similar predicted price levels except for one day where prices spiked above $100 for a few 
hours, at which point a small amount of DR had a large effect on prices and consumer savings. 
Almost 2,000 MW of DR deployment in the North and Central regions combined is predicted to 
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produce about $1.3 million in consumer savings in the baseline scenario. Conversely, only 45 
MW of DR in the south region produced $38 million in consumer savings. 
The South region outlier demonstrates how a small amount of DR can generate 
exponentially higher consumer savings if deployed in a location where the market is clearing in a 
steep portion of the supply curve. While not typical, extreme price events do happen and 
contribute to a large share of the value case for DR in wholesale markets. For example, from 
2015 through 2017, the years for which historical system price data is readily available online at 
the time of writing, there were 100 hours during which the average MISO system price exceeded 
$100/MWh. Of this 12 hours were above $200/MWh, of which 2 hours were above $300/MWh 
[65]. In addition to consumer savings, the baseline model shows modest CO2 emissions 
reductions from DR, on the order of 0.3% - 0.5% of total electric sector emissions from the 
MISO region. Because DR must pass the net benefits test before being deployed, the revenue 
paid to DR providers is less than consumer savings for each region. 
 
Table 2.3 Simulation results by region - baseline scenario. 
 
 
2.5.2. Alternative scenarios 
As discussed in section 2.3.6., we explore how changes to the parameter values impact 
results. The effects of parameter changes are summarized in Table 2.4. The first row in Table 2.4 
presents the results of the baseline scenario for the north and central regions combined. Each 
subsequent row presents average deviations from the baseline for each scenario, totaled across 
the north and central regions, holding all other model parameters constant. For example, the 
values in the second row indicate that increasing from 5 to 10 DR deployments per year 
increases annual consumer savings by $1,054,907 on average across our simulations. We omit 
the outlier results from the south region to better represent effects of DR during non-emergency 
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peak operating conditions. Including the south region results would change these results by 
orders of magnitude.   
To  derive the values in Table 2.4,  we estimated a regression model using the simulated 
results across all scenarios for the North and Central regions. The independent variables in the 
regression are indicator variables corresponding to each of the simulation parameters, 
corresponding to the rows in Table 2.4. Regression coefficients on categorical explanatory 
variables are interpreted as average deviations from the reference category. Thus, each 
coefficient represents an average change from the baseline DR scenario. Because these 
coefficients show average deviations in outcomes predicted by various modeled supply-demand 
equilibria, the underlying data generating process lacks a stochastic element and reporting 
standard errors is not informative. The coefficients from the regression corresponding to each 
parameter adjustment are added to the baseline results to produce the non-baseline values in 
Table 2.4. The output for all 30 scenarios provides the underlying data for these regressions and 
are provided in online appendix 6. The detailed results in the appendix show that consumer 
savings vary across model scenarios between $1.3 million to $17.6 million for the North and 
Central regions during typical peak operating conditions.18  
As reported in Table 2.4, increasing the frequency of deployments per year and 
expanding the amount of DR resources available for deployment increases annual consumer 
savings, CO2 reductions, DR cleared, and price reductions relative to the baseline scenario. This 
is logical, as one would expect an increase in DR deployment frequency or amount to increase 
the magnitude of market effects relative to the baseline scenario. Changing the demand shifting 
parameter to zero also increases the savings, CO2 reductions, and the price effect relative to the 
baseline scenario. This is because in the baseline scenario, the 15% demand shift partially offsets 
the peak hour effects as consumers purchase more energy in off-peak hours. The ‘annual 
deployments’ row indicates that allowing DR to dispatch during non-summer days when more 
cost savings opportunities are available will increase overall consumer savings, while the 
negative coefficient on emissions suggests less opportunity for emissions reductions are 
available during non-summer months. This is because DR deployments during summer months 
often reduce output from less efficient peaking generators, and DR in non-summer months 
sometimes shifts peak energy generated from gas to off-peak energy generated from coal. 
                                                 
18 These numbers exclude the simulations with 96% energy shifting as this is not an empirically realistic level.  
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Finally, increasing DR energy offer costs by 100% reduces annual consumer savings by about 
one-third, decreases emissions savings, lowers the amount of DR cleared, and dampens the 
negative price effect relative to the baseline scenario. This is to be expected, since this scenario 
makes DR resources more expensive for the market operator. 
 
Table 2.4 Average deviations from baseline results by scenario. 
 
Note: Values summarize the results of 30 simulations. Each column represents results for that 
variable in the north and central regions. The top row presents the baseline results, summed over 
the north and central regions. Each subsequent row presents the corresponding scenarios’ 
average deviations from the baseline value. 
Excluding outliers from the South region, the results of our modeling across all our 
simulations show average price reductions ranging from 3% to 9%. This is consistent with past 
analyses of the PJM market, which showed that reducing approximately 1% of peak demand in 
the PJM market would result 5%-8% reduction in LMPs [25], [52]. 
The scenario with a high energy shift produced some interesting results. First, increasing 

















Baseline 1,302,000 16,450,000 1,952 836,000 -0.49 
10 deployments +1,055,000 +10,478,000 +838 +321,000 -0.04 
20 deployments +3,319,000 +33,114,000 +321 +683,000 -0.12 
Expanded amount 
(5,745 MW) 
+996,000 +9,346,000 +562 +465,000 -0.22 
Zero energy shift +461,000 +5,548,000 0 0 -0.35 
High energy shift 
(96%) 
-2,940,000 -29,958,000 0 0 0.80 
Annual 
deployments 
+1,500,000 -3,334,000 -151 +40,000 -0.36 
High energy 
offers 




scenario, suggesting that on off-peak generation in MISO has a higher average emissions content 
than on-peak generation. Secondly, some of our high-rebound simulations produced negative net 
consumer savings. In other words, deploying demand response resources that pass the net 
benefits test in the hour they were deployed actually increased overall costs after taking into 
account the off-peak increase of energy. This occurred because less supply resources are 
available for dispatch in non-peak hours.  The large increase in energy use during off-peak hours  
increased prices on average by more than prices decreased during peak hours, when more supply 
is available to meet high levels of demand. 
In all the high energy shift scenarios except for those in the South region, aggregate 
consumer savings from DR were less than the aggregate revenue paid to DR providers. In this 
situation, the DR is deployed because it passes the net benefits test during the peak hours in 
which the DR is dispatched, and DR providers earn revenue. However, the large increase in off-
peak energy offsets consumer savings, with no corresponding decrease to DR providers’ 
revenue. These results violate the net benefits test in principle, however they still occurred 
because we programmed the net benefits test in our model to be temporally myopic. By this we 
mean that the net benefits test did not incorporate decreased consumer welfare in future periods 
due to energy shifting. This myopic characteristic is also present in the ISO/RTO net benefit test 
methodologies in tariffs filed with FERC. FERC’s final ruling in Order 745 makes no mention of 
incorporating effects of energy shifting in net benefits testing [41]. Furthermore, most ISO/RTO 
net benefits tests in practice are characterized by econometric estimates of the monthly average 
price quantity pair where the supply curve becomes inelastic, with no consideration of how 
energy shifting from DR reduction may offset consumer savings [66]–[70]. As shown by our 
modeling, a demand reduction that occurs at an inelastic portion of the supply curve can fail the 
net benefits test if consumer savings are offset by energy shifting to other periods, without a 
corresponding offset to DR revenue. We identify this myopic characteristic as a policy 
shortcoming of the net benefits test required by FERC and operational in wholesale electricity 
markets across the U.S. Despite this theoretical issue identified in our modeling, we note again 
that this issue occurred only in our simulations with a 96% energy shift. However, while 96% is 
the energy shifting value assumed in EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook modeling, it does not appear 
to be supported by empirical experimental evidence [58]. 
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2.5.3. Effects not quantified 
In addition to what was quantified in this study there are other potential market effects 
which we do not attempt to quantify in our dynamic supply-demand framework. These include: 
• Reduced generation reserve investment. 
• Improved operational efficiency of the transmission and distribution systems. 
• Integration of intermittent renewable generation. 
• Reduced wholesale market price volatility. 
• More competitive power markets. 
• Insurance against extreme events. 
• Improved system reliability. 
• Delayed retirements of coal plants by increasing off-peak demand and reducing 
operational wear and tear induced by using them to follow shifts in load. 
It is clear from the body of literature on the topic that the value from deploying DR 
programs extends across the range of actors and processes within the electricity system. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of these value streams varies greatly across individual markets and 
regulatory environments, emphasizing the need for targeted, market-specific analysis to 
understand the effects of implementing DR within a given market context.  
2.6. Conclusions 
This study quantifies consumer savings and other market effects from increasing 
incentive-based demand response (DR) dispatch in the Midcontinent ISO energy market. It is 
motivated by the fact that regulatory and market barriers in the Midcontinent region keep cost-
effective DR out of the wholesale market, raising electricity prices. We develop a bottom-up, 
dynamic supply and demand model of the Midcontinent market that enables us to make the 
following conclusions: 
1. DR dispatch can generate consumer savings ranging from $1.3 – 17.6 million  under 
typical peak operating conditions.  
2. Model results for the South region demonstrate that consumer savings and other market 
effects can exponentially increase when a small amount of DR is deployed at locations 
with very high prices.  
3. We estimate market effects for a range of scenarios that change DR deployment levels, 
frequencies, and demand-shifting effects. Emissions reductions are modest but positive 
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for most scenarios, and average price effects range from about -$0.50 to -$1.50 per 
megawatt-hour across most scenarios during typical peak operations.  
4. Demand response modeling can be sensitive to energy shifting assumptions. We note 
that the large energy shifting assumption of 96% utilized in the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration’s National Energy Modeling Systems can produce DR 
deployments that violate the net benefits test once the increased post-DR consumption 
is accounted for. The myopic net benefits testing procedures currently used in U.S. 
power markets do not account for this possibility. 
Our supply-demand modeling framework quantifies DR market effects due to supply curve 
shifts, and does not consider other market effects, including reduced or deferred capital 
investments, reduced price volatility, and improved system reliability.  
In section 2.2.3. we discuss how dispatching incentive-based DR resources when their 
marginal deployment cost is lower than the marginal generator is a second-best improvement for 
a market without varying short run price signals. The MISO market has ample incentive-based 
DR resources that are not utilized, many of which can be deployed at lower cost than current 
marginal supply resources. In this way integrating MISO’s DR resources into the centralized 
market dispatch will enhance market efficiency and lead to Pareto efficiency improvements. The 
incentive-based resources are second best to price-based DR because they include a market 
inefficiency in the form of a double-compensation to energy consumers enrolled in the DR 
programs. In this way the consumer savings results from our model are an under-estimate of the 
savings from an effective price-based demand response program. 
Nevertheless, this study suggests it would be prudent for regulators, market operators, 
market participants, and other stakeholders should focus policy efforts to reduce regulatory and 
market rule barriers to deployment of existing DR assets, particularly in locations that experience 
high price spikes. This will improve market efficiency and generate cost savings for electricity 
consumers net of system costs.  
Useful future research would involve a more focused treatment on the relative market 
efficiencies between incentive-based DR versus price-based DR. This would provide 
policymakers useful information about the tradeoffs of each when considering market reforms to 
address the lack of demand side participation. From the perspective of incentive-based DR, 
follow-up work would characterize the institutional and policy barriers, laying out avenues for 
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policy reforms. Finally, future research could involve developing a more comprehensive market 
model that incorporates the strategic incentives faced by firms when bidding demand response as 




SHORT RUN EFFECTS OF CARBON POLICY ON U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
Modified from a paper published in Energies19 
Steve Dahlke 
3.1. Abstract 
This paper presents estimates of short run impacts of a carbon price on the electricity 
industry using a cost-minimizing mathematical model of the U.S. market. Prices of $25 and $50 
per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions cause electricity emissions reductions of 17% and 
22% from present levels, respectively. This suggests significant electricity sector emissions 
reductions can be achieved quickly from a modest carbon tax, and diminishing reductions occur 
when increasing from $25 to $50. The model captures short run effects via operational changes at 
existing U.S. power plants, mostly by switching production from coal to natural gas. A state-level 
analysis yields the following conclusions: 1) states which reduce the most emissions are high coal-
consumers in the Mid-Atlantic and Midwest regions, and 2) fifteen states increase emissions after 
carbon policy because they increase natural gas consumption to offset coal consumption decreases 
in neighboring states. 
3.2.Introduction 
Concern about the costs of climate change motivates researchers to research public policy 
options for reducing greenhouse gases. A tax or a price on greenhouse gas emissions is one way 
to incorporate the costs of emissions into commodity prices and economic decision making. 
Lawmakers in the United States (U.S.) are considering a national carbon price as part of the 
country’s climate change strategy. Such a policy will likely cover emissions across the entire 
economy. Several economy-wide studies have already considered the effects of carbon policy. 
The wide coverage in these studies is done at the expense of more detailed analysis of impacts on 
individual industries. Electricity production causes more greenhouse gas emissions than any 
other sector, so it is important for policymakers to understand detailed effects of carbon policy 
on this industry.  
Most existing studies on carbon policy consider long term effects decades into the future. 
Looking far into the future is important, however near-term impacts can be predicted with more 
                                                 




certainty and are also relevant for policymakers motivated by short-term election cycles. In this 
paper I address a literature gap by providing a granular short run study of the electricity sector. 
Throughout the paper I will refer interchangeably to the policy under study as a carbon tax or a 
carbon price. I simulate the effects of both a $25/ton and $50/ton price implemented on carbon 
dioxide-equivalent (CO2e) emissions from U.S. electricity production. These price levels are 
consistent with laws recently proposed by members of the U.S. congress. To study these policies 
I build an electricity market model using publicly available data from the U.S. federal 
government. All the input data and computer code needed to replicate this analysis, along with 
detailed results, are publicly available online at https://osf.io/59pf6/. 
I estimate that in the short run, $25/ton and $50/ton carbon prices will lead to 17% and 
22% reductions in U.S. electric sector greenhouse gas emissions, relative to today. The results 
suggest that a modest carbon tax will cause significant electricity sector emissions reductions 
quickly as producers switch from coal generation to lower-emitting natural gas generation in 
competitive electricity markets. The $50/ton scenario leads to a 59% reduction in electricity 
production from coal and a 40% increase from natural gas across the country. 
Carbon policy impacts are also analyzed at the state level, because U.S. law is developed 
by representatives elected by citizens from their respective state. Most states reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions in response to the policy. Perhaps counterintuitively, several states 
increase emissions in response to a carbon price. These states increase natural gas production 
above local demand to sell to neighboring states who use it to offset coal production in the cost-
minimizing policy scenario. Some lawmakers have proposed to rebate carbon tax revenues 
equally to all U.S. citizens. The rebate is designed to create a progressive income effect and build 
popular political support for carbon policy.  
The model assumes electricity producers are economically competitive and cost-
minimizing across the U.S. If there are areas of the country where these assumptions do not hold 
the market response described here would likely be mitigated or slowed down. The model holds 
both the electricity capital stock and demand levels fixed. These are reasonable short run 
assumptions because of, 1) the long lead time required to build a new power plants, and 2) the 
regulatory mechanisms in place that shield most electricity consumers from short-run price 
fluctuations. In this way, the results do not include long run impacts from the retirement of high-
emitting power plants and the construction of lower-emitting plants. The results also do not 
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incorporate demand response to price changes as the impact of the carbon policy is passed 
through to retail customers over time. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides background 
information and a literature review relevant for the study. Section 3.3 discusses the methods, 
data, model formulation, and validation. Section 3.4 presents and discusses results aggregated to 
the national and regional levels. Section 3.5 analyzes results at the state level. Section 3.6 
summarizes the main conclusions. 
3.3. Background 
Many studies have utilized integrated climate-economy models to analyze the dynamics 
between natural climate systems and human-driven economies. Notable examples include [71]–
[75]. Tol [76] provides a summary of this specific literature, while Zhang et al. [77] provides a 
wider review of research relevant to carbon policy. Weitzman in 1974 [78] concluded that a price 
instrument in the form of a tax or a fee is a more efficient policy to internalize costs of 
environmental emissions than a quantity instrument in the form of a cap or quota. This is valid if 
reasonable assumptions hold about marginal benefits and costs of emissions abatement. 
Subsequent papers considering more complex uncertainties and intertemporal choice associated 
economic decision making have upheld Weitzman’s principal conclusion favoring a tax over a 
quantity policy instrument. Newberry [79] includes a summary of these studies. The efficient tax 
level is equal to the lifetime marginal social cost from an additional unit of emissions. 
The integrated climate–economy models mentioned in the previous paragraph estimate 
the social costs of greenhouse gas emissions. The cost estimates vary widely across studies 
because they are sensitive to three uncertain categories of parameters: 1) the social discount rate, 
2) the climate-economic damage function, and 3) the probability distribution of catastrophic 
climate outcomes. Recently calculated global lifetime average estimates of present-valued 
marginal costs range from $6 per ton of CO2 to $900 per ton of CO2 [80]. Several years ago, a 
task force reviewed the body of literature on climate change and economic costs to estimate a 
marginal social cost of carbon (SCC) to be used by the U.S. government in cost-benefit analyses 
of environmental regulation [81]. Their effort established a central SCC value of $21 per ton of 
CO2, while recommending sensitivity analyses be conducted at $5, $35, and $65 in 2007 dollars.  
Growing public concern about climate change and the rising costs of greenhouse gas 
emissions are motivating the development of public policy to reduce emissions. In 2018 there 
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were three similar but distinct national, economy-wide carbon price proposals introduced in the 
U.S. congress [82]. The starting tax values from these proposals ranged between approximately 
$25 and $50/ton in 2020, motivating the values considered in this study. One proposal includes a 
flat per capita revenue rebate, another similarly credits revenues to citizens by offsetting payroll 
taxes, and the third uses revenue to fund infrastructure and other government programs. 
Several studies have investigated the economic impacts of carbon policy. A carbon price 
will have far-reaching economic impacts because many of the materials, final goods, and 
services in modern economies rely on fossil-fuel based energy inputs. Motivated by these far-
reaching economic impacts, most studies model entire economies to understand how a carbon 
price will affect economic actors through all stages of production and consumption [83]–[86]. 
Recently, Chen and Hafstead [87] estimated an economy-wide U.S. carbon tax stabilizing at 
$43.40/ton would achieve the 28% emissions reduction by 2025 necessary to satisfy the U.S.’s 
commitment to the Paris Climate Accord. 
These economy-wide studies consistently show large impacts on the electricity industry 
[88], but the conclusions are limited by simplifying assumptions made in the model for 
computational tractability. This includes treating entire economic sectors, like consumers, 
government, or industries, as single aggregated agents with one market-clearing quantity per 
year. Implications of heterogeneity within industries generally are not considered. Taking the 
electricity sector as an example, the greenhouse gas emissions from electricity production in the 
U.S. vary across the country. Some regions of the country produce electricity using mostly coal, 
while other regions use a combination of natural gas and a variety of fuels that emit no 
greenhouse gases, including nuclear, wind, solar, and hydro. Furthermore, electricity supply 
availability and preferences for electricity consumption vary considerably throughout the day 
and across seasons.  
It is therefore important to conduct granular economic and policy studies of sectors that 
produce significant levels of greenhouse gas emissions, or will experience significant impacts 
from climate change. Electricity production is the largest single contributing industry to climate 
change damages, being responsible for 32% of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
in 2010 [89]. In the United States, approximately 28% of greenhouse gas emissions come from 
electricity production [90]. Other sectors that have been studied which contribute large amounts 
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of greenhouse gases, or are highly impacted by climate change, include transportation [91], 
agriculture [92], [93], manufacturing [94], and tourism [95]. 
Most electricity and carbon policy studies have modeled long run effects looking decades 
into the future. Several recent studies were published together in a special journal issue of 
Energy Economics [96]. It is of course important to study the long run effects of proposed 
policies. However, significant long run uncertainty exists for variables that influence electricity 
investment decisions, including capital and fuel costs. This uncertainty leads to divergent 
conclusions across studies with similar scopes. For example, Paul et al. [97] find the least-cost 
long-term electricity industry response to a carbon tax is to significantly increase natural gas-
fired electricity, while Caron et al. [98] concludes the optimal response to a comparable tax 
involves wind energy becoming the dominant source of electricity. Mai et al. [99] shows that 
methodological differences across electricity system models lead to significant differences in 
optimal investment plans over the long run, even when data inputs are made equal across 
models. 
The short run effects of carbon policy can be estimated with greater precision and 
granularity. However, a much smaller literature exists on the near-term effects for the electricity 
sector. Voorspools and D’haeseleer [100], and Van den Bergh and Delarue [101] conduct such 
studies for western Europe, while Newcomer et al. [102] looked at a subset of the U.S. in 2007. 
The literature has made clear that the changes in the relative economics of coal- and gas-powered 
production largely determine the first-order effects of a carbon price in the U.S. electricity 
industry. Electricity fuel-switching in response to carbon policy is also discussed in Delarue et al. 
[103] and Palmer et al. [104]. Since the mid-2000’s, the electricity industry in the U.S. has 
dramatically changed in ways that have important implications on the impacts of carbon policy. 
Natural gas fuel prices have decreased exponentially, from a high of $13.42 per million British 
Thermal Units (BTU) in October 2005 to a low of $1.73 in March 2016. The capital stock of the 
industry has begun to adjust to these low prices. Electricity generation from natural gas has 
increased 130%, while that from coal has decreased by 40%, from 2001-2018 [105]. These 
results suggest significant additional fuel switching will occur in response to a carbon price. This 
study is a timely contribution given the growing discussion and proposed legislation in the U.S. 




3.4.1. Model overview 
To study the short run effects of carbon policy I build an electricity market optimization and 
simulation model. The model solves for hourly least-cost production levels across the U.S. given 
available power plants, transmission capacity and operational constraints. I separate the U.S. into 
10 regions that approximate existing electricity market boundaries, shown in Figure 3.1. Power 
plants are dispatched to meet hourly demand for each market region. Imports and exports between 
regions are constrained to approximate existing transmission capabilities between markets. Power 
plants are dispatched to satisfy exogenously provided and inelastic hourly demand. Inelastic 
demand is a reasonable assumption consistent with empirical evidence [106] because in the short-
run most electricity consumers do not see changes in their electricity price. Incentive-based 
demand response resources are sometimes administratively deployed in real-time electricity 
auction markets [107]. However, these events rarely occur and as a result have minimal impact on 
the overall elasticity of electricity demand. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Electricity market regions defined in the model. 
 
I assume no transmission congestion within market regions. This is partly because the 
U.S. lacks a quality source of public data on sub-regional electric transmission lines. Abstracting 
from local transmission congestion also improves the model’s computational tractability. I avoid 
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using integer constraints to further ease the computational burden. This involves abstracting from 
non-linear components of power plant operations decisions, including start-up and shut-down 
costs, and minimum run times. Both local transmission congestion and non-linear operational 
constraints can have significant implications on any given power plant’s production schedules. 
For this reason, I do not emphasize plant-level results. 
Despite these simplifying assumptions, aggregated results from the model provide useful 
insights to policymakers at the national, regional, and state levels. The baseline scenario 
replicates aggregate levels of recently observed emissions, transmission levels, market prices, 
and generation reasonably well. Details from a baseline model validation exercise are discussed 
in section 3.3.5. At the state level, Mann et al. [108] analyzed results from an electricity market 
model that similarly abstracts from transmission and non-linear power plant constraints for the 
state of Texas. They compared their results with highly detailed commercial models that 
incorporate local transmission and power plant operational constraints, and found relatively 
consistent aggregate results between the simple and detailed models. 
The carbon price is simulated as an increase in marginal costs proportional to each power 
plant’s observed CO2-equivalent (CO2e) emissions rate. After implementing the carbon price, the 
optimization re-orders supply curves in order of marginal costs. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2, 
which presents supply curves for all U.S. electricity generation with and without a carbon price. 
A carbon price shifts emitting electric generators up. The non-emitting forms of generation, 
including wind, solar, and hydro, do not shift vertically. The carbon price also shifts many 
natural gas power plants to the left, represented as the green portions of the curve, while shifting 
coal plants to the right, represented in red. This is because coal plants become relatively more 
expensive compared to natural gas after the policy. Coal plants have higher emissions intensities 
than natural gas and have to pay a higher carbon tax for every unit of electricity produced. 
Natural gas combined cycle plants emit 60% less greenhouse gases per unit than coal plants. 
Specifically, capacity-weighted average CO2e emissions rates for U.S. power plants are 
approximately 2,194 lbs/MWh for coal plants and 899 lbs/MWh for natural gas combined cycle 
plants [109]. Thus, the primary mechanism through which a carbon price causes emissions 
reductions in the short run is from replacing coal generation with natural gas. 
The electricity market model assumes competitive, cost-minimizing suppliers and 
inelastic demand. Theoretical evidence suggests these two market characteristics lead to 100% 
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pass through of emissions costs to consumers. Sijm et al. [110] describes in detail the economic 
theory on emissions cost pass through in electricity markets. Consumers will purchase the same 
quantity of electricity in the short run no matter the price, because they are shielded from price 
changes. Competitive supply results in suppliers offering to sell electricity at their marginal 
production costs. When a tax is added to suppliers’ marginal costs, the full additional cost is 
reflected in their new offers, and consumers accept the price increase without reducing their 
quantity demanded. Consistent with this theory, Sijm et al. [111] empirically found high levels of 
carbon price pass through into electricity prices in Europe. Woo et al. [112] also find relatively 
high (but less than 100%) carbon cost pass through into California electricity prices. They note 
their results are influenced by market distortions related to trading and emissions leakage into 
neighboring markets not covered by California’s carbon policy. If electricity market structures in 
the U.S. deviate from this model, it will tend to reduce the level of pass through to the electricity 
price. For instance, a market characterized by oligopoly supply and inelastic demand will have 
lower pass-through because profit-maximizing firms’ marginal revenue functions are steeper 
than the demand curve.  
 
Figure 3.2 Short run U.S. electricity supply curve estimates with and without a carbon tax. 
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3.4.2. Algebraic model formulation 
This section presents an algebraic formulation of the electricity market model. The model 
utilizes the following parameters:  𝑄𝑝,𝑚 maximum operating capacity of plant 𝑝 during month 𝑚 in megawatts (𝑀𝑊) 𝑐𝑝,𝑡  production cost of plant 𝑝 in hour 𝑡, in dollars per megawatt-hour ($/𝑀𝑊ℎ) 𝐶𝑂2𝑝  carbon dioxide-equivalent emissions rate for plant 𝑝, in 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑀𝑊ℎ  𝐷𝑟,𝑡 demand in market region 𝑟 during hour 𝑡, in 𝑀𝑊ℎ 𝑂𝑟,𝑡 hourly operating reserves in region 𝑟, in 𝑀𝑊ℎ 𝑡𝑥𝑟′,𝑟 transmission capacity limit from region 𝑟′ to region 𝑟, measured in 𝑀𝑊ℎ 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟,𝑚 average net international imports into market region 𝑟 for month 𝑚 𝑓𝑒𝑒  carbon price imposed by policy, in $/𝑀𝑊ℎ 
The set of choice variables are the levels of hourly production from each plant, 𝑞𝑝,𝑡, and the 
levels of power transferred between each market region, 𝑞𝑡𝑥𝑟′,𝑟,𝑡, in 𝑀𝑊ℎ. Each market region 
coordinates to minimize the cost of dispatching power plants across the United States, subject to 
capacity constraints and demand levels. In this way, the optimization problem is algebraically 
formulated as follows: minimize𝑞𝑝,𝑡,   𝑞𝑡𝑥𝑟′,𝑟,𝑡 ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑝,𝑡(𝑐𝑝,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑂2𝑝𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑝∈𝑟𝑟 ) , ∀ 𝑡 (3.1)  
Subject to the following constraints: ∑ qp∈r,t + ∑ (qtxr′,r,t − qtxr,r′,t r′≠rp∈r ) + impr,m ≥ Dr,t + Or,t,   ∀ r, m, t ∈ m      (3.2) 0 ≤ qp,t ≤ Qp,m,    ∀ p, m, t ∈ m      (3.3) −txr′,r ≤ qtxr′,r,t ≤ txr′,r,   ∀ r, r′ ≠ r, t (3.4) 
The objective function in equation 0 chooses hourly plant production and regional 
transmission flows to minimize production costs, including the carbon price. Equation 0 requires 
that production plus net imports from all other regions meet demand plus operating reserves in 
region 𝑟, for all hours. Equation 0 limits production from each plant to be less than or equal to its 
total capacity, and non-negative. Equation 0 limits energy transfers across market regions to the 
available transmission capacity. Prices in the model are equal to the production cost of the 
marginal power plant for each hour in each market region. This is equivalent to the increase in 
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system production cost if demand increased by a small amount. In mathematical optimization 
terms, this is the Lagrange multiplier of the demand constraints. 
3.4.3. Data 
The data used to construct the model are all publicly available and mostly downloaded 
from U.S. government websites. Power plant capacity limits (𝑄𝑝,𝑚) were obtained from the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration’s (US EIA) survey form 860 [113]. I assign each plant to one 
of 11 electric generation technology categories.20 To incorporate the probability of power plants 
going offline for maintenance or unanticipated outages, capacity limits were discounted by 
corresponding average outage rates reported by the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) [114]. 
Capacity limits for wind and solar were determined from recently-observed average 
monthly output levels, calculated using US EIA historic generation data from form 923 [115]. 
These capacity limits adjust by month to capture seasonal variation in wind and solar outputs. 
Solar plants are allowed to generate during the day, and turn off at night. Rather than incorporate 
hourly wind and solar generation profiles into the model, these simplifications are done both to 
reduce complexity and because the primary short-run impacts of a carbon price are borne by 
emitting generators on the margin. Because wind and solar rarely operate on the margin, their 
overall dispatch levels will be relatively unaffected by a carbon policy in the short term. One 
limitation with this simplification is the model underestimates the hourly ramping requirements 
for the dispatchable fleet caused by variable wind and solar output. A useful extension of this 
work estimate the impact on the results from incorporating more detailed treatment variable 
renewable energy and its interaction with increased cycling of dispatchable generators.  
While electricity markets experience variation in renewable energy output on any given 
day, Wan [116] presents empiric data from across the U.S. showing aggregated average wind 
outputs are fairly stable over 24-hour daily cycles, so average intra-day variation for wind is 
unlikely to be problematic when calculating aggregate results. In addition, hydro plant operators 
face complicated dispatch decisions that vary by year and season according to reservoir storage 
levels. Rather than attempt to incorporate this behavior in the model, hydro capacity limits are 
also set to recently-observed average output levels. 
                                                 
20 The categories are hydro, coal, natural gas combined cycle, natural gas combustion turbine, nuclear, wind, oil, solar 
pv, solar thermal, other-clean, and other-natural gas. 
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Electricity production costs (𝑐𝑝,𝑡) include the cost of fuel, operations, maintenance, and 
emissions. US EIA survey form 923 also reports monthly, generator-level fuel costs for fossil-
fueled plants. Aggregated statistics of fuel costs for the remaining technologies and operations 
and maintenance (O&M) costs for all technologies were gathered from the U.S. National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)’s Annual Technology Baseline dataset [117]. Plants that 
are located in California or the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the northeastern 
U.S. have greenhouse gas emissions costs in the baseline scenario. These existing carbon costs 
were obtained from The World Bank [118]. Recently observed electricity demand levels (𝐷𝑟,𝑡) 
and regional transmission flows from the US EIA’s electric system operating data were used 
[119]. Public data on transmission capacity (𝑡𝑥𝑟′,𝑟) is not available. Instead, capacity levels were 
set to recently observed average transmission flows. International trade of electricity into and out 
of markets is exogenous to the model, and determined by monthly-averaged flows across the 
Canadian and Mexican borders. Some market regions rely on significant levels of imports. New 
England and New York have the highest levels of import intensity, with annually-averaged 
international net import levels of approximately 10% and 6% of annual peak demand, 
respectively. 
Operating reserves (𝑂𝑟,𝑡) are included to reflect uncertainty in electricity demand and 
generation output. They are set to equal 3% of demand plus 5% of average wind and solar output 
for each region and hour. This “3+5” heuristic was determined by GE & NREL [120] to perform 
well for temporally-granular electricity market models. Power plant emissions rates (𝐶𝑂2𝑝) were 
calculated using recently observed plant-level emissions data from the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (US EPA) [109]. US EPA reports CO2-equivalent (CO2e) emissions rates. 
These rates standardizes and incorporates the global warming potentials of methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) released by power plants, in addition to CO2. 
However, approximately 98% of total U.S. electricity CO2e emissions are CO2.21 
3.4.4. Model construction and solution procedure 
The model was solved as a set of linear programs using the open-sourced LPSolve 
software. LPSolve is a revised simplex and branch-and-bound mixed-integer linear program 
                                                 
21 The methodology for calculating CO2e levels is described on page 18 of US EPA (2016)’s eGRID technical 
documentation [121].  
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solver [122]. I access the solver using a wrapper function in R [123]. R is a free, open-sourced, 
object-oriented programming language and computing environment [124]. To understand how 
the model is coded and solved it is useful to think like the computer in terms of operations on 
data in matrices and vectors. Therefore, in this section I supplement the algebraic model 
formulation in section 3.3.2 with a more detailed model description using matrix and vector 
notation. I solve the model as a single linear program for each hour, so the data objects described 
herein are indexed by hour 𝑡 (for example, 𝒙𝑡). As described in section 3.3.2, some model inputs 
vary hourly (production costs 𝑐𝑡 and demand 𝐷𝑡), some vary monthly (plant capacity constraints 𝑄𝑚), and others do not vary at all (transmission capacity limits 𝑡𝑥 and the relations described by 
the constraint coefficients included in matrix 𝑨). All the information necessary to fully describe 
how model variables change over time were provided in section 3.3.2. The time subscripts for 
data objects are omitted from the following description to reduce clutter. 
The linear program is solved in the following standard format: 
Minimize  𝒄𝑻𝒙 
Subject to 𝑨𝒙 ≤≥ 𝒃 (3.5) 
Where 𝒙 is the vector of choice variables, 𝒄 is the vector of objective function 
coefficients, 𝑨 is the matrix of constraint coefficients, and 𝒃 is the vector of scalars on the right 
side of the constraint equations. In this application, 𝒙 includes the vector of power plant 
production decisions 𝒒 plus transmission levels 𝒒𝒕𝒙. There are 𝑃 = 8,377 power plants in the 
dataset. There are also 𝑇𝑋 = 90 possible transmission connections between market regions, 
because each of the 10 regions has 9 potential trading partners. In the U.S., several pairs of 
market regions do not have any physical transmission connections between them, in which case 
the associated transmission capacity 𝑡𝑥𝑟′,𝑟 is constrained to be zero. In total, 𝒙 has 𝑃 + 𝑇𝑋 =8,467 non-negative elements (8,377 + 90), and is arranged as follows: 𝒙 = {𝒒, 𝒒𝒕𝒙} ∈ ℝ+𝑛 , 𝑛 = 𝑃 + 𝑇𝑋 (3.6) 
The vector 𝒄 ∈ ℝ+𝒏  includes 𝑃 plant-level variable production costs, followed by 𝑇𝑋 
transmission costs, in $/𝑀𝑊ℎ. Production costs for each plant include fuel costs, variable 
operations and maintenance costs, and baseline carbon costs for plants in the California and 
RGGI regions. Carbon prices are added to 𝒄 for the carbon policy scenarios. I assume 
transmission costs are equal across all market regions. Future applications could explore the 
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implications of heterogeneous transmission costs between market regions, if public transmission 
cost data became available. 
The vector 𝒃 ∈ ℝ+𝑚 includes the right-hand-side values of all the constraints. The first 𝑃 
elements represent the capacity constraints for each plant 𝑸, followed by the 𝑇𝑋 transmission 
constraints 𝒕𝒙. This is followed by 𝑅 = 10 demand constraints 𝑫, which are equal to demand 
plus operating reserves minus international imports for each market region. Thus, 𝒃 has 𝑚 =8,477 elements (8,377 + 90 + 10), and is arranged as follows: 𝒃 = {𝑸, 𝒕𝒙, 𝑫} ∈ ℝ+𝑚, 𝑚 = 𝑃 + 𝑇𝑋 + 𝑅 (3.7)  
The matrix 𝑨 ∈ ℝ+𝑚×𝑛 includes the constraint coefficients, with each of the 𝑚 rows 
corresponding to a constraint equation. In explaining the construction of the constraint 
coefficient matrix, it is useful to separate it into the block matrix shown in Figure 3.3. The 
dimensions for each of the six submatrices are described on the outside. The first 𝑃 = 8,377 
rows in 𝑨 correspond to the plant capacity constraints in the vector 𝒃. They are constructed by 
column-binding an identity matrix (𝑰) of order 𝑃 with a zero matrix (0) of dimensions 𝑃 × 𝑇𝑋. 
The following 𝑇𝑋 = 90 rows correspond to the 90 transmission constraints that follow in 𝒃. This 
is constructed by column-binding a 𝑇𝑋 × 𝑃 zero matrix with an identify matrix of order 𝑇𝑋.  
 
Figure 3.3 Layout of constraint matrix A. Capital letters on the outside describe the matrix 
dimensions. 
 
 The final 𝑅 = 10 rows in Figure 3.3 correspond to the demand constraints, one for each 
market region. Within these final rows, the 𝑅 × 𝑃 submatrix 𝑫 is built by assigning 1 to each 
element whose column 𝑝 corresponds to a plant in the region corresponding to row 𝑟 (∀𝑝 ∈ 𝑟). 
Furthermore, the 𝑅 × 𝑇𝑋 submatrix 𝑻 is built by assigning 1 to each element whose column 𝑡𝑥 
represents a transmission flow into the region corresponding with row 𝑟 (∀𝑡𝑥 ∈ 𝑟). In this way, 
the elements are assigned according to equation set 8. This ensures that for each hour, the 
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elements of 𝒙 are chosen such that the sum of all plants and transmission imports meets demand 
for each market region. 𝑑𝑟,𝑝 = {10 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 ∈ 𝑟     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 ,    𝑡𝑟,𝑡𝑥 = {10 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑥 ∈ 𝑟     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  (3.8) 
The last input required for the model is a constraint direction vector of length 𝑚 defining 
the direction of each inequality constraint. The choice variables 𝒒 and 𝒒𝒕𝒙 must be less than or 
equal to the plant and transmission capacity constraints, and the sum of supply plus imports must 
be greater than or equal to demand. In this way, the first 𝑃 + 𝑇𝑋 elements of the constraint 
direction vector are “≤” while the last 𝑅 elements are equal to “≥”. 
3.4.5. Baseline scenario 
A baseline scenario without a national carbon policy was solved, and the model was 
validated by comparing the outputs to recently observed data. Model-estimated annual CO2e 
emissions from electricity production in this baseline scenario were 1.62 billion metric tons. The 
US EPA-reported CO2e emissions from the power sector in 2017 were 1.78 billion [125]. This 
difference stems from the fact that the EPA’s greenhouse gas inventory includes all stationary 
combustion emissions related to the generation of electricity. US EIA’s form 860, the dataset 
providing the power plants used in the model, covers electric power plants with 1 megawatt 
(MW) or greater of combined nameplate capacity. Greenhouse gas emissions from small electric 
generators will show up in EPA’s inventory but not in EIA’s inventory, and as a result will not 
be included in the model. 
Model-estimated electricity prices were compared with recently observed prices in 
market regions that report such data [126]. This comparison is reported in Table 3.1. Modeled 
prices closely match observed prices, except for divergences in California and New England. In 
these two regions, modeled prices are significantly higher than what has been recently observed. 
This is likely because California and New England have high levels of low-cost distributed 
electricity generation that are not picked up by the datasets underlying the model. For example, 
California and New Jersey have the highest levels of electricity production from small-scale 
solar plants less than 1 MW in nameplate capacity among all states [127]. Again, US EIA’s form 
860 dataset covers electric power plants larger than 1 MW of combined nameplate capacity, so 
these distributed generators are not included in the model. Incorporating distributed generation 
would result in a rightward shift of the supply curves (or leftward shift in net demand curves) for 
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these two regions, lowering equilibrium prices. Fortunately, the short-run relative economics 
between natural gas and coal plants after a carbon price that underly the results of this study are 
not significantly impacted by distributed solar, and these divergences in California and New 
England will not significantly alter the results.  
Table 3.1 Annually-averaged prices ($/MWh) by region, comparing modeled prices with 2016-
2018 historic averages. 
 
Next, modeled generation levels for dispatchable technologies were aggregated by fuel 
type and compared to aggregate observed generation levels reported in the EIA form 923 dataset. 
Modeled generation levels are compared to observed levels from recent years in Table 3.2. The 
comparison shows the model slightly under-predicts coal generation compared to the observed 
level. In the model, a significant fraction of coal units are ramped down on a daily basis during 
low-demand hours when they are not economically competitive. Cost-competitive combined 
cycle natural gas plants replace the coal generation that ramps down. Figure 3.4 plots modeled 
electricity production by fuel source for one week and a full year, and shows the daily cycling 
dynamics of these two fuel sources. This daily cycling may be causing the model to underpredict 
coal generation due to non-competitive market conditions and generator ramping costs not 
considered in the model. For example, in some markets it is relatively common for coal plants to 
self-schedule and produce even if their offer exceeds the system’s marginal cost. During these 
periods, wind and solar may be curtailed instead of coal if supply exceeds demand. In addition, a 
comparison between the baseline model results and actual generation was done for CAISO, a 
market for which detailed historic hourly generation data is available for 2016. This comparison 
is presented in Figure 3.5 and Table 3.3. 
 
Region Modeled Actual 
California 41.72 31.35 
Mid-Atlantic 30.74 30.62 
Midwest 27.04 28.21 
New England 45.97 34.84 
New York 32.65 28.62 





Table 3.2 Annual modeled electricity generation and annually-averaged historic generation 
(2015-2017, GWh) for U.S. by fuel type for dispatchable technologies. 
 
 
Table 3.2 also shows modeled production from natural gas combustion turbine plants is 
less than recently observed levels. Combustion turbines are primarily dispatched during periods 
with high market prices and tight supply conditions. This is because the largely deterministic 
model under-predicts unplanned contingencies which in reality cause high prices. These include 
the unexpected loss of a large generator or transmission line. 
As discussed in section 3.3.3 and shown in Figure 3.4, wind, solar, and hydro are 
modeled by setting production equal to each plant’s recently observed output level. This 
approach results in accurate aggregate levels of wind and solar production, while abstracting 
from the complicated, weather-driven hourly variation characteristic of wind and solar 
production profiles and seasonal, reservoir-driven production of hydro. Profit-maximizing 
owners of these technologies will offer to sell in a competitive electricity market at close to zero 
dollars because they don’t have fuel costs and have low marginal production costs. As a result, 
these power plants are rarely on the margin, and the operator’s decision to schedule cost-
effective wind, solar, and hydroelectricity will not change in the short run due to a carbon price. 
Rather, the majority of short-run effects from the carbon price come from relative changes in 
production costs between coal and natural gas combined cycle generation. Combined cycle 
natural gas generation replaces coal generation on the margin after a carbon price because it has 
a lower greenhouse gas emissions intensity. 
 
Fuel Modeled Historic 
Coal 1,090,806 1,285,042 
Natural gas combined cycle 1,389,433 1,133,813 
Natural gas combustion turbine 61,778 132,957 





Figure 3.4 Modeled U.S. electricity production for the first week of July (top) and the full year 
(bottom). 
 
The conclusions from this model validation exercise suggest that, although there are 
some deviations, we can have general confidence in the study’s results. Electricity prices 
predicted by the model match recently observed electricity prices for most regions where data is 
available. The modeled prices deviate from observed levels in California and New England due 
to significant levels of distributed generation not captured by the model. There are also relatively 
small deviations between coal and natural gas generation predicted by the model, explained by 
non-competitive market conditions that are not modeled. The changes in short-run relative 
economics between coal and natural gas from a carbon policy is the most important factor 
driving the short-run effects. If one can accept the reasonable assumption that effects from these 
operational and non-competitive dynamics remain constant for a short period of time after a 
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carbon price is implemented,22 then the overall implications of these deviations on the quality of 
results are minor. 
 
Figure 3.4 Annual hourly generation in CAISO for baseline model (top panel) and actual in 2016 
(bottom panel). 
                                                 
22 This type of assumption is commonly invoked when attempting to understand and model economic phenomena. It 
is often referred to by the Latin phrase “ceteris paribus”, translated to “holding all else constant.” 
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Table 3.3 Annual generation (GWh) by technology, CAISO. 
 
3.5.Discussion 
3.5.1. Overall results 
The model predicts short-run decreases in annual electricity sector CO2e emissions from 
current levels of 17% from a $25/ton carbon tax and 22% from a $50/ton carbon price. The 
emissions levels for the three modeled scenarios are displayed in Table 3.4. There were 5.7 
billion total tons of U.S. CO2e greenhouse gas emissions emitted in 2017 [125]. The simulated 
electricity emissions reductions are equivalent to 4.9% and 6.3% reductions in economy-wide 
greenhouse gas emissions for the $25 and $50 case, holding emissions from all other industries 
constant. The short run electricity emissions reductions from a $50/ton tax are equivalent to 
approximately 21% of the U.S.’s voluntary 2025 greenhouse gas reduction commitment under 
the Paris Climate Accord [128]. This calculation is presented visually in Figure 3.6. The short-
run electricity greenhouse gas emissions reductions estimates come from operational changes to 
the existing capital stock. They do not include additional long run emissions reductions caused 
by new investments in low-carbon electricity production and retirements of high-carbon 
electricity production assets caused by the policy. These results suggest significant short-run 
emissions reductions can be achieved from a U.S. carbon price on the electricity sector. The tax 
on these emissions generates $33.5 billion in government revenue in the $25 scenario, and $63.0 
billion in the $50 scenario. 
Table 3.4 Annual U.S. electricity sector CO2e emissions (billion metric tons) in the three 
scenarios. Percentages are relative deviations from the baseline scenario. 
 
Modeled Actual
Thermal 118,251,864      96,028,573      
Other 2,803,269           13,068,248      
Solar 15,314,335        15,638,635      
Wind 7,953,520           12,238,954      
Hydro 21,219,269        13,791,747      
Nuclear 19,170,858        18,529,360      











Figure 3.6 Short run electricity emissions reductions from carbon tax, relative to the total U.S. 
commitment for the Paris Climate Accord. 
 
Almost all of the short-run emissions reductions come from switching electricity-sector 
consumption from coal to natural gas. As discussed in section 3.3.1, this is because most 
marginal electricity production in the U.S. is produced from one of these fuels. A carbon price 
will have a relatively large immediate effect on the short-run marginal costs of coal and natural 
gas power plants. Table 3.5 displays total generation from coal and natural gas generation in 
each of the three scenarios. It shows the model estimates a 43% short-run reduction in U.S. coal 
generation from a $25/ton carbon price, and a 59% reduction from a $50/ton price. Much of this 
is offset by increased natural gas generation of 30% and 40% in the two scenarios, respectively. 
 
Table 3.5 Annual U.S. electricity production from coal and natural gas (GWh) for the three 
scenarios. Percentages are relative deviations from the baseline scenario. 
 
 
The results also suggest a carbon price will have significant short run price effects in 
wholesale electricity markets. The largest price impacts occur in coal-heavy markets including 
the Central, Mid-Atlantic, and Midwest regions. Table 3.6 presents average prices by scenario 
broken out by market region, while the last column displays the change in price after 
implementing a $50/ton price. The price impacts are qualified by the fact that these are first order 
effect estimates derived from short run supply side adjustments to the carbon price. In the 
electricity industry, most customers are insulated from short run price changes through long term 




















contracts and regulator-approved retail electricity prices. These price increases will eventually be 
offset by downward pressure from reduced demand and new investments in electricity supply, 
both of which are second-order effects not considered in the model. 
 
Table 3.6 Average annual prices ($/MWh) by region for the three scenarios. The last column 
displays the price difference between the $50/ton and baseline scenarios. The last row displays 
the national average weighted by regional consumption. 
 
Transmission flows adjust so that regions which experience relatively larger increases in 
marginal production costs after the carbon price import more energy from less-affected regions. 
Table 3.7 presents average transmission flows across regions in the baseline and $50/ton 
scenarios. The most striking impact is in the Northwest region. Electricity trade from the 
Northwest to California dropped to approximately one-third of the baseline level, offset by a 
trade reversal from California and the Southwest region. Ample transmission capacity between 
these three regions, along with relatively more cost-competitive natural gas capacity across the 
Western U.S. after the carbon price, resulted in the Northwest drastically reducing coal 
generation in the $50 scenario to one-fifth of its baseline level. These results are qualified by the 
fact that there are hydroelectric production constraints across the west that are not modeled but 
determine in part regional trade. Furthermore, there are market structures and contractual 
Region Baseline $25/ton $50/ton $50/ton - Baseline 
California 41.72 48.14 63.70 21.98 
Central 26.09 48.24 69.47 43.38 
Mid-Atlantic 30.74 51.10 72.01 41.26 
Midwest 27.04 49.03 70.93 43.89 
New England 45.97 54.56 65.23 19.26 
New York 32.65 42.53 54.57 21.92 
Northwest 27.00 44.88 62.20 35.19 
Southeast 33.56 50.83 67.32 33.76 
Southwest 26.92 40.98 53.21 26.29 
Texas 25.95 40.42 53.45 27.50 




relationships across the west and other regions that are not modeled but tend to reinforce status 
quo levels of regional trade in the short-run [129]. 
 
Table 3.7 Average electricity trade (MW) by market region, baseline and $50/ton scenarios. 
Region pairs with less than 50 MW average trade are omitted. 
 
3.5.2. State-level results 
Implementing a national carbon price in the U.S. would most likely occur after political 
negotiation and compromise among state representatives in the U.S. Congress. Understanding 
state-level impacts is politically important for developing national carbon policy. In this section I 
analyze state impacts on emissions, generation, costs, and tax revenue. Table 3.8 at the end of 
this section displays a comprehensive set of model results for each state. I discuss the results in 
Table 3.8 more fully with multiple references throughout this section. 
Figure 3.7 maps changes in CO2e emissions by state after simulating a $50/ton price. 
These correspond to the ‘CO2e’ columns in Table 3.8. Most net emissions reductions at the state 
level occur in coal-heavy states that are part of large regional markets, including West Virginia, 
Ohio, and Kentucky. These states reduce coal production and replace it with lower-carbon 
From To Baseline $50/ton 
California Northwest 0 630 
Central Midwest 774 657 
Mid-Atlantic Midwest 6 124 
Mid-Atlantic New York 114 3 
Mid-Atlantic Southeast 210 72 
Midwest Central 129 195 
Midwest Mid-Atlantic 373 244 
Midwest Southeast 652 215 
New England New York 16 66 
New York Mid-Atlantic 99 212 
New York New England 286 235 
Northwest California 3,307 1,320 
Northwest Southwest 746 118 
Southeast Mid-Atlantic 53 190 
Southeast Midwest 10 439 
Southwest California 3,164 3,142 
Southwest Northwest 295 955 




electricity production from neighboring states. Perhaps surprisingly, the cost-minimizing 
response to a federal carbon price involves increasing emissions in several states, including 
California, Florida, and Louisiana. These net emissions increases occur in states that are 
increasing natural gas production to offset coal reductions in neighboring states. This can be seen 
more explicitly in Figure 3.8, which maps state-level changes in coal and natural gas generation 
(the “Coal” and “Gas” columns in Table 3.8). For example, West Virginia has a relatively large 
coal decrease and small natural gas increase. On the other hand, California increases natural gas 




Figure 3.7 Change in CO2e emissions by state after $50/ton tax. 
Examining changes in electricity production costs by state provides additional insights 
into the effects of carbon policy. Production costs include the fuel, operations, maintenance, and 
emissions costs needed to produce electricity. They are equal to the area under the electricity 
supply curve, including the curves previously displayed in Figure 3.2. State production costs 
decrease when coal generation decreases, and increase when natural gas generation increases. 
These production costs should not be interpreted as net costs to society from the carbon policy. 
Rather, they provide insights into the magnitude of shifts in generation between fuel types and 
across states. As was described in more detail in section 3.3, the model assumes suppliers 
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minimize costs and sell in a competitive market. As a result, suppliers would not incur 
production costs if there was not adequate revenue available in the market to cover their costs. 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Decrease in coal generation (top) and increase in natural gas generation (bottom) from 
a $50/ton carbon tax. 
 
Figure 3.9 plots the change in production costs by state on the vertical axis as a result of a 
$50/ton price. The horizontal axis displays the state’s reduction in CO2e emissions from a 
$50/ton price. The width of each bar is proportional to the magnitude of emissions reduction. 
States that increase emissions are located to the left of zero on the horizontal axis, while states to 
the right of zero reduced emissions. State-level production cost changes correspond to the “Cost” 
columns in Table 3.8. Figure 3.9 shows a few interesting results. All states to the left of the 
origin increased emissions after a carbon tax, because they increased natural gas generation after 
a carbon price to serve demand in neighboring states. Montana experienced a net decrease in 
electricity production costs after a $50/ton carbon tax, even though all emitting electricity 
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production became more expensive. This occurred because Montana coal producers decreased 
production while out-of-state electricity producers increased generation to make up the deficit. 
Both Florida and Texas had large increases in natural gas generation, leading to their relatively 
large production costs increases. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Emissions reduction and change in electricity production cost by state after a $50/ton 
tax. 
All states that have emitting electricity production generate federal government revenue 
from the carbon tax. Tax revenue collected by state is displayed in the “Tax” columns in Table 
3.8. The highest revenue-generating states in the $50/ton scenario are Texas, Florida, and 
California at 7.0, 4.6, and 3.3 billion dollars per year, respectively. The revenue raised by a 
carbon tax could be rebated as an equal lump sum to all U.S. citizens. This policy proposal is 
motivated by income inequality concerns and the desire to make a carbon tax revenue neutral. 
The $63 billion raised from the electricity industry in the $50/ton scenario would result in 
approximately $194 per person per year in rebates. 
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Table 3.8 State-level results 
 
$25/ton $50/ton
State CO2e Tax Coal Gas Cost CO2e Tax Coal Gas Cost
Alabama -9,449 1,095 -9,168 3,001 1,011 -14,689 1,928 -13,756 4,284 1,850
Arizona -2,791 605 -15,551 32,088 1,136 -2,476 1,227 -15,718 33,348 1,799
Arkansas -6,387 723 -12,325 14,654 836 -9,567 1,288 -16,493 16,415 1,363
California 9,229 1,503 0 22,627 1,406 14,305 3,259 0 33,741 3,605
Colorado -5,114 493 -10,935 14,215 670 -7,671 858 -15,009 16,921 1,065
Connecticut -791 148 -744 344 107 -1,168 278 -1,101 495 231
Delaware 3,625 146 -45 8,290 394 4,916 356 -104 10,509 695
Florida 16,440 2,141 -6,926 56,824 3,921 22,425 4,581 -8,532 73,151 7,073
Georgia -17,161 953 -19,372 6,757 598 -18,914 1,818 -24,075 11,969 1,538
Idaho 270 49 0 618 67 705 120 0 1,377 168
Illinois -24,568 783 -29,165 11,832 359 -23,221 1,633 -35,725 25,708 1,613
Indiana -20,879 981 -22,774 5,573 509 -25,994 1,707 -28,898 7,151 1,134
Iowa -8,215 863 -8,617 2,696 745 -14,490 1,413 -15,229 3,669 1,180
Kansas -16,118 395 -16,036 2,652 93 -24,464 374 -25,659 6,009 -21
Kentucky -24,373 1,026 -23,892 1,160 420 -31,911 1,675 -33,586 4,956 978
Louisiana 12,704 927 474 27,852 1,789 21,336 2,286 802 41,693 3,719
Maine 66 75 0 149 68 115 153 0 269 152
Maryland 625 89 -391 2,269 136 1,439 219 -678 4,276 341
Massachusetts 222 195 0 526 185 331 396 0 806 401
Michigan -1,690 570 -5,809 10,368 709 -1,920 1,129 -8,337 14,081 1,347
Minnesota -7,463 442 -12,074 11,582 482 -9,989 758 -16,154 14,301 805
Mississippi 1,663 852 -1,171 5,028 992 4,187 1,831 -2,843 10,702 2,157
Missouri -10,522 1,738 -11,534 3,115 1,542 -25,073 2,748 -26,971 3,721 2,216
Montana -14,476 83 -13,550 319 -232 -15,885 95 -15,187 826 -234
Nebraska -2,111 625 -2,652 1,957 625 -4,784 1,117 -5,564 2,730 1,089
Nevada 449 436 -3,286 9,293 606 596 879 -3,777 10,606 1,090
New Hampshire -293 78 -400 284 53 -275 157 -420 378 136
New Jersey 12,158 703 244 27,236 1,489 14,753 1,536 -3 32,405 2,528
New Mexico -7,354 137 -9,537 5,797 80 -6,623 310 -10,109 8,046 328
New York -1,207 628 -3,330 4,435 561 -2,037 1,214 -5,061 6,039 1,170
North Carolina -3,966 795 -11,785 15,898 961 -6,147 1,481 -15,933 19,069 1,645
North Dakota -7,769 552 -7,341 790 413 -18,392 573 -17,256 1,644 274
Ohio -21,358 1,837 -29,091 14,627 1,500 -33,404 3,072 -45,822 22,029 2,597
Oklahoma 2,674 744 -3,310 18,257 1,205 8,120 1,760 -2,117 26,935 2,613
Oregon 1,960 265 -1,281 7,698 444 2,356 549 -1,367 8,748 776
Pennsylvania -18,010 1,639 -25,141 14,533 1,405 -22,845 3,037 -36,827 25,301 2,916
Rhode Island 77 72 0 185 66 123 146 0 295 146
South Carolina -502 347 -3,130 5,049 420 -569 692 -3,808 6,054 785
South Dakota -689 65 -1,102 760 60 -681 131 -1,441 1,378 141
Tennessee -18,383 559 -17,726 -566 23 -23,214 877 -22,765 -175 208
Texas -20,978 3,413 -46,197 59,461 4,012 -17,793 6,985 -56,908 83,118 8,253
Utah -19,292 442 -20,965 1,758 -32 -22,575 720 -24,753 2,373 177
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Virginia 9,449 807 -282 22,472 1,569 13,787 1,831 1,308 28,732 2,917
Washington -6,487 234 -8,142 6,174 214 -6,753 456 -8,813 7,334 464
West Virginia -23,986 1,352 -25,626 768 655 -39,182 1,945 -43,138 2,976 857
Wisconsin -11,590 448 -11,840 3,475 237 -10,704 940 -12,289 6,205 833
Wyoming -15,615 467 -14,135 288 201 -25,996 415 -23,580 350 -5
Total -277,979 33,524 -465,662 465,165 34,708 -359,914 62,951 -643,693 642,946 67,112
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Notes: ‘CO2e’ displays change in 𝐶𝑂2𝑒 emissions in thousand matric tons, ‘Tax’ displays tax 
revenue in million dollars, ‘Coal’ and ‘Gas’ display the change in coal and gas generation in 
gigawatt-hours, ‘Cost’ displays the change in production cost in million dollars. 
3.6. Conclusions 
This paper presents results from an electricity market model built to estimate short run 
effects of a U.S. carbon price on the U.S. The results suggest a modest carbon tax can cause 
significant short run greenhouse gas emissions reductions from the U.S. electricity sector. The 
model estimates a $25/ton tax leads to 17% emissions reductions and a $50/ton tax leads to 22% 
reductions from today’s levels of electricity emissions. These are equivalent to approximately 
4.9% and 6.3% reductions from current economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions. The estimated 
emissions reductions from a $50/ton electricity industry carbon tax represent  21% of the U.S.’s 
2025 voluntary commitment under the Paris Climate Accord, holding emissions from all other 
industries constant.  
The electricity market model captures short-run operational changes to existing power 
plants caused by the carbon price. The majority of emissions reductions come from decreased 
coal consumption and increased natural gas consumption. The model keeps the electricity capital 
stock fixed. The results do not include additional long-run emissions reductions due to increased 
investments in low carbon-emitting production and increased retirements of high-carbon emitting 
power plants. The model assumes inelastic, exogenous demand and does not capture long-run 
emissions reductions from demand reductions. Demand response is considered a long run 
dynamic because the short run elasticity of electricity demand is low, and most electric utilities 
in the U.S. pass changes in costs through to retail prices faced by customers over periods of 
several years. 
Future areas of research involve studying the sensitivity of these results when including 
more detailed operational constraints in the market model, including flexibility limits and 
transmission constraints. In a similar way, it would be useful to study how the modeling of 
market power in electricity markets impacts the results of a carbon policy. Finally, studying the 
impacts of including more detailed hourly renewable energy profiles is a promising area for 
future research. 
I consider a scenario in which carbon tax revenues are rebated on a flat per capita basis to 
all U.S. citizens, consistent with recently proposed legislation in the U.S. Congress. Short run 
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electricity carbon tax revenues in a $50/ton scenario raise approximately $194 per citizen. These 
results in general involve transfers from relatively high-emitting, low-population states in the 
middle of the country to low-emitting, high-population states on the east and west coasts. 
Most emissions reductions come from states that consume large amounts of coal in the 
Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, and Western U.S. The highest emissions reducing states include West 
Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, Wyoming, and Indiana. The cost-minimizing response to a carbon tax 
involves increased emissions from several states. These states increase natural gas consumption 
to export electricity to and replace coal consumption in neighboring states that becomes more 
expensive after the carbon price. States that increase emissions in response to the carbon policy 
do so to enable a larger amount of lower-cost emissions reductions from their neighbors. If this 
were not allowed, states that consume large amounts of coal would achieve less emissions 
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